Yet what was refreshing about the Cartagena meeting was that these differences were aired in public. Though conflict has taken center stage in previous summits, most were highly scripted events that provided more of a photo op than a meaningful forum for debate. This time, debate – and discord – took center stage.
The lasting legacy of the Cartagena summit, however, will likely be the beginning of a serious regional debate on international drug control policies. With the apparently adept leadership of Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, the issue was discussed at a private, closed-door meeting of the presidents – according to press accounts, it was the only issue discussed at that meeting – and Santos later announced that as a result of the presidents’ discussion, the Organization of American States (OAS) was tasked with analyzing the results of present policy and exploring alternative approaches that could prove to be more effective. A topic long considered taboo – the U.S. “war on drugs” – is now being seriously questioned and debate on new strategies – including legal, regulated markets – is officially on the regional agenda.
The significance of this development cannot be underestimated. For years, Washington has used its economic and political muscle to squash any dissenting opinions from Latin American governments. Academics and other experts who proposed alternative policies were ostracized as “legalizers,” even if that is not what they were proposing. The “L” word could not even be mentioned in official circles. In fact, the present debate is not about outright legalization per se but rather legal, regulated markets. Administration officials, nonetheless, continue to misconstrue the issue. At the summit, President Obama said that drug traffickers could “dominate certain countries if they were allowed to operate legally without any constraint.”
Now, Latin American governments have turned the tables, taking on a leadership role in considering alternative policies. Numerous sitting presidents – including Santos, Guatemala’s Otto Pérez Molina, Costa Rica’s Laura Chinchilla and even Mexico’s Felipe Calderon – are lamenting the failure of present policy to stem the flow of illicit drugs or reduce the violence associated with the drug trade. There is also widespread frustration that while Latin American countries are paying a high political, social, and economic cost from both drug trafficking and drug policies themselves, Washington’s approach to the drug issue remains on auto-pilot, with no serious debate evident on Capitol Hill or in the White House.
Guatemala’s president, retired general Otto Pérez Molina, has emerged as the primary promoter of rethinking the drug war and has insisted that all alternative options must be on the table, including legal, regulated markets. On March 24, he hosted a Central American regional summit, “New Routes Against Drug Trafficking.” Though all of the region’s presidents initially accepted the invitation to participate, the presidents of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras dropped out at the last minute (Honduras sent its Vice President) – no doubt due at least in part to U.S. pressure. Indeed, Pérez Molina’s initiative has brought more U.S. officials to the region than at any moment in recent history, including Vice President Joe Biden, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Under Secretary of State, Maria Otero, and the top drug policy official at the State Department, William Brownfield. Nonetheless, those present at the Guatemala meeting point out that a lively debate took place and it helped ensure that the drug issue was raised at the summit.
While making clear that no change in U.S. policy is in the offing, Washington has reluctantly agreed to participate in a debate. At a press conference with President Santos on April 15, President Obama said: “I think it wouldn’t make sense for us not to examine what works and what doesn’t, and to constantly try to refine and ask ourselves, is there something we can do to prevent violence, to weaken these drug traffickers, to make sure that they’re not peddling this stuff on our kids and they’re not perpetrating violence and corrupting institutions in the region,” hastily adding, “I’m not somebody who believes that legalization is a path to solving this problem.” In a presidential election year, the administration is no doubt going to tread very carefully when it comes to the drug issue.
The United States is no doubt pleased that the OAS was tasked to study the issue. The Secretariat of its Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) is traditionally led by someone appointed by the U.S. government (presently it is former U.S. diplomat, Amb. Paul Simons) and it is widely perceived across the region as a U.S.-driven agency. However, ultimately, CICAD’s agenda and focus is dictated by member states. The burden is now on those member states advocating reform to ensure that the OAS effectively carries out its mandate to explore all alternative policies and to include in the discussion relevant experts and organizations with significant expertise, such as the Pan American Health Organization.
Present international drug control policies are deeply-rooted and change will no doubt come slowly. However, as a result of the Cartagena summit, for the first time a meaningful debate on developing and implementing drug control policies that are more humane and effective is underway. The genie is out and will be very hard to put back in the bottle, as much as U.S. officials might try.
Coletta A. Youngers is the Latin America Regional Associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium and a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).
If you watch crime shows on television or read crime fiction, you’re no doubt familiar with the term “tune him up.” It’s defined at Urban Dictionary as: “A beat down especially when administered by the cops.” Perhaps I’m reading too much into it, but what seems implied is that the victimizer-turned-victim is being “tenderized” to make him more amenable to questioning and admitting to his guilt (lack thereof notwithstanding).
At IPS News, Gareth Porter writes (emphasis added):
In a blog post in The National Interest, Paul Pillar, former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, wrote that the “Western message to Tehran” seems to be, “(W)e might be willing to tolerate some sort of Iranian nuclear program, but only one consisting of facilities that would suffer significant damage if we or the Israelis later decide to bomb it.”
Greg Thielmann, senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, said in an interview with IPS, “There are Americans who believe it is important to keep all Iranian facilities at risk in case Tehran decided to build a nuclear weapon [but that] is more an interest of the Israelis than of the United States”.
The Iranian facility that Israeli is most interested in keeping at risk is Fordow, the underground uranium facility near the city of Qom. Porter again.
Reza Marashi, the former State Department specialist on Iran and now research director at the National Iranian-American Council, said … the Israelis who have “turned their inability to destroy Fordow into a major issue”.
But (emphasis added again) …
While the demand on Fordow clearly responds to a U.S. need to accommodate Israel, it is also in line with Obama administration efforts to intimidate Iran by emphasising that it has only a limited time “window” in which to solve the issue diplomatically [before Israel decides to] strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in the absence of progress toward an agreement guaranteeing Iran would not go nuclear.
In other words, the United States is letting Israel “tune up” Iran with threats in hopes that Iran will agree to the United States and the P5 +1’s points in negotiations. (In Istanbul on April 14, relations were cordial, lending cautious optimism to the next meeting in Baghadad on May 23.) Besides, Tehran, it’s for your own good because otherwise we’ll be unable to prevent our henchman, Israel, from unleashing the full force of its fury on you.
Allow us, now, to return to the assertions that we “might be willing to tolerate some sort of Iranian nuclear program, but only one consisting of facilities that would suffer significant damage if we or the Israelis later decide to bomb it” and “it is important to keep all Iranian facilities at risk in case Tehran decided to build a nuclear weapon.”
How, you may be asking yourself, can one expect a state to agree to purposely leave itself vulnerable? Odd as it sounds, it’s not unprecedented. Missile defense is infused with the same line of, if not magical, wishful thinking. It works like this: conventional thinking on nuclear strategy holds that missile defense upsets — “destabilizes” — the whole nuclear-deterrence apple cart. Russia, for example, is considered vulnerable to an initial nuclear strike by the United States, during which many of its nuclear weapons in land-based silos would be wiped out. Also, many of those launched at the United States would be destroyed while in the air by U.S. missile defense (in our dreams: our missile defense systems are years — decades even — from that kind of capability).
Anyway, the crux of this theory is that since Russia knows that under this arrangement it’s going to lose missiles both on the ground and in the air, it’s motivated to build more to compensate. In other words, the United States would be safer if it refrained from implementing missile defense and maintained a calculated vulnerability. (I’ve elaborated on this elsewhere.)
Israel wants Fordow less fortified against attack — to come complete, as it were, with a self-destruct button. Meanwhile, the United States is turning Fordow into a self-destruct bottom for the negotiations. At PBS Frontline Tehran Bureau, Muhammad Sahimi writes that in an interview, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said:
The way to confront this strategy of Iran’s [stalling and exploiting divisions among its adversaries] is to demand explicit conditions calling for ceasing all uranium enrichment, removal of all enrich[ed] uranium from the country, and its exchange for material which cannot be [used to] develop nuclear weapons, and agreement to give up the underground facility in Qom [the Fordow site].
But assuming that [this] accurately reflects the Obama administration’s goals and demands … they will be non-starters and will doom the negotiations before they even get under way.
Iran built the Fordow uranium enrichment site precisely to have a fallback facility if its other sites, such as those in Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak, are attacked and destroyed. The site is effectively indestructible at present.
In fact, though, it may be much adieu about nothing.
… even though the prowar factions in the United States and elsewhere still refer to it as a “secret site.” … most Western media reports fail to inform the public … that the site is also monitored and safeguarded by the IAEA. I cannot imagine any scenario under which Iran, and in particular the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the state’s most powerful organ, will agree to dismantle Fordow.
In other words, it’s as if by including the Fordow proviso, the United States and the P5+1 are intentionally sabotaging the negotiations.
The U.S. News and World Report’s Debate Club focused on the so-called ‘Buffet Rule’ this week. The measure, which would apply a minimum tax of 30 percent to individuals making more than a million dollars a year, failed to clear the Senate cloture vote yesterday after a party-line vote. Prior to the Senate vote, the Debate Club laid out the main arguments for and against the measure. Collins’ response, which highlighted the loan burden caused by the Bush tax cuts, has received the most positive votes up to this point. Here’s his response:
Congress should pass the “Buffett rule” to restore fairness to the federal income tax system and raise urgently needed revenue. But lawmakers should go further to rebalance the tax code and eliminate many provisions that benefit only the wealthiest 1 percent and a couple of thousand transnational corporations.
It is a national disgrace that millionaires pay effective income tax rates substantially lower than middle class taxpayers do.
As super-investor Warren Buffett has pointed out, his effective tax rate has been declining for years. In 2010, Buffett disclosed he paid 17.4 percent of his income in federal taxes, while most of his office colleagues paid 33 to 41 percent of their incomes.
This is largely the result of the way our tax code privileges income from wealth and investments over income from work and wages. In 1986, income from wages and capital gains were both taxed at the same rate of 28 percent. Today, we tax higher incomes from wage earnings at 35 percent and income from capital gains and dividends at 15 percent, creating huge distortions.
The wider public widely supports increasing taxes on millionaires because they recognize the U.S. has developed a “two-tier” tax system. We have one set of rules for the vast majority of people and another set of advantaged rules for the super-wealthy. They understand how tax rules have been tilted in favor of the 1 percent at the expense of everyone else.
Instituting the Buffett rule will be a step in the right direction but inadequate to reverse several decades of regressive tax policies and meet our revenue needs.
Since 2001, we have borrowed over $1 trillion to pay for the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts for the wealthy. We should reverse the Bush tax cuts and institute several additional revenue provisions. A financial speculation tax—a modest penny tax on every four dollars of financial transactions—would generate over $100 billion a year and dampen the kind of speculative trading activity that crashed the economy in 2008. Closing offshore tax havens that enable transnational corporations to game their taxes down to zero would also generate over $100 billion.
The Buffett rule moves us to greater fairness and trust in the tax system and ensures the rest of our nation’s taxpayer that we are not chumps for paying our fair share on April 17.
For the rest of the responses, visit the U.S. News Debate Club.
The recent decision by the Taliban and one of its allies to withdraw from peace talks with Washington underlines the train wreck the U.S. is headed for in Afghanistan. Indeed, for an administration touted as sophisticated and intelligent, virtually every decision the White House has made vis-à-vis Afghanistan has been a disaster.
On Mar. 15 the Taliban ended preliminary talks with Washington, because, according to a spokesman for the insurgent organization, the Americans were being “shaky, erratic and vague.” The smaller Hizb-i-Islami group followed two weeks later.
That both groups are refusing to talk should hardly come as a surprise. In spite of the Obama administration’s talk about wanting a “political settlement” to the war, the White House’s strategy makes that goal little more than a mirage.
The current U.S. negotiating position is that the Taliban must cut all ties with the terrorist group al-Qaeda, recognize the Afghan constitution, lay down their arms, and accede to a substantial U.S. military presence until at least 2024. The U.S. has 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, its allies another 40,000. The current plan calls for a withdrawal of most of those troops by the end of 2014.
What is hard to figure out is why the White House thinks any of its demands—with the exception of the al-Qaeda proviso—have even a remote possibility of being achieved? Or exactly what the Americans think they are going to be “negotiating” with Mullah Omar of the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hezb-i-Islami, or Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani Group?
The Obama administration’s initial mistake was to surge some 33,000 troops into Afghanistan with the aim of beating up on the resistance and forcing it to negotiate from a position of weakness. That plan was always an illusion, particularly given the ability of the insurgents to fall back into Pakistan to regroup, rearm, and recruit. In any case, the idea that 140,000 foreign troops—the 330,000-member Afghan National Army (ANA) is incapable of even defending itself—could defeat a force of some 25,000 guerillas fighters in a country as vast or geographically formidable as Afghanistan is laughable.
As a series of recent attacks demonstrate, the surge failed to secure Kandahar and Helmand Province, two of its major targets. While NATO claims that insurgent attacks have fallen as a result of the U.S. offensive, independent data collected by the United Nations shows the opposite.
In short, after a decade of war and the expenditure of over $450 billion, Afghanistan is a less secure place than it was after the 2001 invasion. All the surge accomplished was to more deeply entrench the Taliban and elevate the casualty rate on all sides.
The second U.S. error was to estrange Pakistan by wooing India in order to rope New Delhi into Washington’s campaign to challenge China in Asia. First, Obama ditched his campaign pledge to address the volatile issue of Kashmir, the flashpoint for three wars between Indian and Pakistan. Second, the White House ignored India’s violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowed it to buy uranium on the world market—the so-called 1-2-3 Agreement—while refusing that same waiver to Pakistan. Add the American drone war and last November’s deadly attack on Pakistani border troops, and most Pakistanis are thoroughly alienated from the U.S. And yet a political solution to the Afghan war without Islamabad is simply impossible.
The U.S. demand to keep Special Forces troops in Afghanistan in order to continue its war on “terrorism” is not only a non-starter for the insurgents—the Taliban are, after all, the target of thousands of deadly “night raids” carried out by these same Special Forces—it is opposed by every country in the region save India. How the White House thinks it can bring the Taliban and its allies to the table while still trying to kill and capture them, or maintain a military presence in the face of almost total regional opposition, is hard to figure.
The more than 2,000 yearly night raids have eliminated many of the senior and mid-level Taliban leaders and atomized the organization. When it comes time to negotiate, NATO may find it has literally hundreds of leaders with whom it will have to cut a deal, not all of whom are on the same page.
That the insurgency would lay down its arms has a quality of magical thinking to it. Not only is the insurgency undefeated, but according to a leaked NATO report, captured Taliban think they are winning. The report—based on 27,000 interrogations—also found that “Afghan civilians frequently prefer Taliban governancy over GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], usually as a result of government corruption, ethnic bias and lack of connection with local religious and tribal leaders.”
There is no popular support for the war, either in Afghanistan, the U.S., or among its allies. The most recent ABC Poll found that 69 percent of Americans want the war to end, and according to a poll in the Financial Times, 54 percent of the British want to withdraw immediately.
As for supporting the Afghan constitution, why would an undefeated insurgency that sees its enemies in disarray and looking at a 2014 U.S.-NATO withdrawal date, agree to a document they had no part in drafting?
None of this had to happen. Back in late 2007, Saudi Arabia carried a peace offer from the Taliban in which they agreed to cut ties to al-Qaeda—a pledge they reiterated in 2008—and accept a time table for foreign troop withdrawals. In return, a national unity government would replace the Karzai regime until elections could be held, and the constitution would be re-written.
Both the Bush and Obama administrations ignored the offer, apparently because they thought they could bring the Taliban to heel. It was thinking that verged on the hallucinatory.
The trump card holders these days are holed up in the high peaks or hiding in plain sight. Opium is booming in Helmand Province because the Taliban are protecting farmers from drug eradication teams, even blowing up tractors that are used to plow the crop under.
As the 2014 withdrawal date looms, the White House’s options are rapidly narrowing. If it holds to its plans to quarter troops in Afghanistan, the insurgency will fight on, and Washington’s only regional ally will be India, a country that can deliver virtually nothing toward a peace agreement. If it insists the insurgency recognize the Karzai regime and the constitution, it will be defending a deeply corrupt and unpopular government and a document that excluded the participation of country’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtun. Pashtuns make up the core of the Taliban.
How the U.S. managed to get itself into this mess needs to be closely examined. The State Department under Hillary Clinton has become little more than an arm of the Pentagon, and the White House has shown an unsettling penchant for resorting to violence. In the meantime Afghanistan is headed for a terrible smashup.
The World Bank estimates that 97 percent of Afghanistan’s economy is military related. The war is drawing to a finish, and there is no evidence that the U.S. or NATO has any intention or ability to keep the aid spigots wide open. Europe is in the middle of an economic meltdown and the U.S. economy is struggling.
NATO provides about $11 billion a year to support the Afghan army, a figure that will probably drop to about $4 to $5 billion after 2014. There is already talk of reducing the 335,000-man Afghan army to a more manageable and less expensive force of 230,000.
There is a window of opportunity, but only if the Obama administration takes advantage of it. A strategy that might work—when it comes to Afghanistan there are no guarantees—would include:
• A ceasefire and stand down of all offensive operations, including the highly unpopular “night raids.”
• Shelving any long-term plans to keep combat troops or Special Forces in the country, and shutting down the drone war in Pakistan.
• Urging the formation of a national unity government and calling for a constitutional convention.
• Sponsoring a regional conference aimed at keeping Afghanistan neutral and non-aligned.
• Insuring aid continues to flow into Afghanistan, particularly aimed at upgrading infrastructure, improving agriculture, and expanding education.
At home, the Congress should convene hearings aimed at examining how the U.S. got into Afghanistan, who made the key decisions concerning the war and regional strategy, and how the country can avoid such disasters in the future.
It may be too late and, in the end, NATO may tuck its tail between its legs and slink out of Afghanistan. But the deep divisions the war has created will continue, and civil war is a real possibility. The goal should be to prevent that, not to pursue an illusory dream of controlling the crossroads to Asia, a chimera that has drawn would be conquerors to that poor, ravaged land for a millennium.
IHS’ Richard Cochrane reports that despite some success the interim government has had ahead of the planned June 2012 national elections in bringing militias to heel — 8,000 militiamen are now “pledged” to become border guards — several obstacles remain to the National Transitional Council’s efforts to establish a secure state. A plan to distribute payments to militiamen and their families — essentially, a plan to secure legitimacy for the NTC in the fighters’ eyes — has been undermined by the NTC’s reliance on militias to manage the payments. The result of which, unfortunately but unsurprisingly, has been an uneven, unaccountable distribution of the money:
Names have been omitted from payment lists and others erroneously added, sparking angry protests, some of which have descended into violence. Local media has reported several incidences of militia groups plundering payment centres located in rival neighbourhoods, or in areas deemed to be insufficiently loyal to the spirit of the revolution.
This is the least of the government’s militia problems, though. Only in March did militia leaders agree to “turn over to the interim government strategic sites, such as airports and border crossings,” to the NTC (the AFP’s correspondent for Libya, Dominique Soguel, hinted that given Libya’s size and limited infrastructure, official control of airports is a much-needed objective for the NTC to accomplish). While separatist stirrings in eastern Libya received substantial attention from the government — and a relatively swift political response that has somewhat dimmed the prospects of federal autonomy — ongoing fighting in southern Libya has reportedly left dozens dead in the past few months. Although the non-Arab minority population in the region supported the NTC, tribal rivalries — and, in the International Crisis Group’s view, a lack of a functioning judicial system or police force — have flared up. To the north, on Libya’s western coast, Berber and Arab militias continue to clash. In both the south and west, the NTC’s armed forces have had a difficult time imposing cease fires. One reason for this is that “even when government security forces are dispatched to resolve crises, there is no guarantee that they will be the strongest force in the area,” an IHS report noted, though the main hindrance is still the NTC’s difficulties in co-opting the new armed groups and the old state machinery.
Outside support for the NTC remains limited. The outcome of a trans-Saharan conference on border security is presumably up in the air following the coup in Mali. And the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is “not a peacekeeping mission but was there to assist the Libyan authorities to help them create the necessary institutions to govern the country and ensure the respect of fundamental rights for all,” a spokesperson told Xinhua recently, also noting in a press conference that “the main responsibility of disarming and integrating the militias” falls to the NTC.
Of course this is the case: an externally imposed agreement would not be regarded as legitimate. But so far, the NTC has failed to do either on its own, as one cannot expect a “third force” in the form of a peacekeeping mission — and it is not clear the NTC even desires such a mission. But it is one thing to subpoena oil majors like Eni SpA and Total SA over their past conduct in Libya, and quite another to do so over all these armed groups, especially those in Misrata who make incursions into refugee camps near Tripoli. Perhaps the trial of of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, who will probably be triedf in Libya, instead of going to France or the ICC, will send a message — though the biggest problem now is not holding Qahdafi loyalists accountable, but gaining authority over the NTC’s ostensible followers. That message, though, is not being received well by human rights groups and the UN, which suspect the proceedings may amount to a kangaroo court since, as noted above, the NTC has not yet set up judiciary.
At this point, the NTC has to hope that in keeping its electoral schedule, that the militias do not engage in voter intimidation, though some militias are reportedly already looking to set up political arms to run in the Constituent Assembly elections. “If the leaders of local militias were to decide to intervene to influence the outcome of an election, there is no power or authority that could stop them,” North Africa watcher George Joffe told Agence France Presse. Libya may yet prove to be the exemplar of Obama’s foreign policy, but not in the way that advocates hoped last year when NATO intervened should the ongoing violence affect the electoral process, which is almost certainly going to be happen — the question is not “if?” but “to what extent?”
In this week’s OtherWords editorial package, Donald Kaul connects the racist dots linking the Supreme Court’s strip-search ruling and the Trayvon Martin case, and Raul A. Reyes says that if Romney chooses Marco Rubio as his running mate it wouldn’t make Latino voters swoon. On our blog, I weigh in on the lack of byline diversity in the nation’s top op-ed sections. Get all this and more in your inbox by subscribing to our weekly newsletter. If you haven’t signed up yet, please do.
- Pothole Nation / Sam Pizzigati
We can thank inequality for America’s inadequate — and increasingly unsafe — basic infrastructure.
- Rubio’s False Promise / Raul A. Reyes
He’s on the wrong side of too many issues that matter to Latinos.
- Let’s Protect Children, Not Guns / Marian Wright Edelman
If Congress passed stronger gun laws and closed loopholes, it would save lives.
- High-Speed Collusion / Joel Kelsey
Verizon wants to ink cartel-like deals with a cabal of cable companies — its former competitors — to resell each other’s products.
- Breathing While Black / Donald Kaul
Strip searches are now legal after arrests for violating leash laws or riding a bicycle without an audible bell.
- The GOP’s Money Man / Jim Hightower
Like ugly on a hog, Romney just can’t hide the depth of his personal wealth.
- The Poor as Collateral Damage / William A. Collins
There are places where basic food, shelter, health care, and good schools are available to everyone, but not here.
- Crime Watch / Khalil Bendib (Cartoon)
As a rule, anything the New York Times says about developments in Latin America should be taken with a couple of handfuls of salt. The paper regularly does its readers a disservice by painting a picture of developments in the region created in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Case in point: an April 12 report titled “Trade, Energy and Drugs Are Topics for Obama at Summit of the Americas” by correspondent Jackie Calmes, which made the claim that “For the most part, the tension over Cuba seems mostly to be behind Mr. Obama.” According to Calmes, “Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, announced earlier this month that he would boycott the meeting in Colombia because Cuba, as usual, was not invited, but he failed to persuade other leftist leaders in the region to do the same,” and that Cuban President Raul Castro “said he did not want to attend anyway, sparing Mr. Obama the prospect of any photo opportunities with a Castro.”
Of course, we have no way of knowing whether Castro actually said that and neither does the Times. However, according to the Associated Press, the Cuban leader had expressed a desire to attend the meeting but was “delicately” told by the Summit host, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, that that would be impossible because it would put U.S. President Barack Obama in the position of “facing an awkward meeting with the Cuban leader or having to boycott the summit himself.”
The 6th Summit of the Americas was scheduled for April 14-15 in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. According to the Falklands/Malvinas-based Merco Press, “Though the summit’s official agenda ranges from technology to poverty reduction, Cuba was once again shaping into the No. 1 hot potato for those gathering in the Caribbean port city.”
There are 43 nations participating in the summit; only two – the U.S. and Canada – oppose Cuba’s participation. On April 12, a pre-summit foreign ministers meeting is said to have failed to agree on a last minute proposal to invite the island nation
However, reading Calmes’ report one might get the impression that the issue of Cuba’s participation in the leadership gathering had ceased to be much of an issue and Correa was isolated in his position. No mention was made of the statement made weeks ago by Bolivia’s President Eva Morales that “We have arrived with the conviction that this must be the last summit without Cuba.” Or, of Santos’ statement: “I hope this is the last summit without Cuba.”
Nor did the Times report note that the recent visit to the US by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff came following her stay in Cuba and consultations with President Castro. While in Havana she criticized the existence of the U.S. base and prison at Guantanamo Bay, and the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba.
Perhaps more revealing of the Times’ approach to the unfolding situation was its failure to note the symbolism of – or indeed, even report on – the pre-summit visit to Havana of Mexican President Felipe Calderon, where, according to Prensa Latina, he expressed “His government’s interest in bringing relations with Cuba to the highest level.” Calderon arrived in Cuba April 11 for a two-day visit.
According to Reuters, “Calderon said on Wednesday upon his arrival in Havana that ‘in spite of our natural and different points of view about various issues,’ an effort would be made during the visit to ‘take our bilateral relation to its best level’.”
“We want to broaden trade and investment between Cuba and Mexico,” Calderon told journalists in Havana. ““We are interested in cooperating in health, education, culture and sports, as well as in bilateral exchanges in energy,” said Calderon. “My visit is due mainly to the friendship and brotherhood existing between the two peoples.”
From Cuba Calderon flew to Haiti and from there was on to the Summit in Colombia.
As it turned out that the exclusion of Cuba was indeed a big hot potato at Cartagena de Indias and it is clear the issue is not going away. Despite the wishes of Washington and Ottawa this was almost certainly
the last time the pushy norteamericanos determine who comes to summits and who does not.
Carl Bloice, a member of the National Coordinating Committee of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, is a columnist for the Black Commentator. He also serves on its editorial board.
Bolivian President Evo Morales announced that he would rescind the contract awarded to Brazilian company OAS to build a road through the Amazon rainforest. This is the most recent complication in the production of the three-part road, intended to link Brazilian ports in the Amazon with those in Peru and Chile, resulting in better infrastructure that would encourage investment and trade in Bolivia. The $420 million construction project is primarily funded by the Brazilian bank BNDES, who is responsible for coming up with 80% percent of the project’s financial backing. For a variety of reasons, the construction of the road has become highly controversial. Indigenous groups–who have traditionally served as Morales’s support base, protested the road’s construction, which intends to cut through Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park or Tipnis. The cancellation of the contract with OAS by Morales casts further doubts about whether the road will ever be fully completed.
The road’s unpopularity sparked mass protest from over 1,500 Bolivians, primarily indigenous groups and their supporters, who marched 500km for 60 days to La Paz earlier this year. Critics of the road have suggested that this is an example of Brazil’s regional hegemony in Latin America, arguing that Morales has abandoned his promises to advocate for environmental and indigenous rights. In a piece run by the Guardian at the time of the protests, Ernesto Sanchez, one of the organizers, expressed concern that, “The highway is being built for Brazil so that it can export its products to Bolivia…Here we’d only be left with debts because all the benefits go to Brazil.” In response, Morales claimed that the road would no longer extend into the TIPNIS region. This decision was made in response to the overwhelming opposition from indigenous and leftist Bolivian groups.
Recent developments produced additional speculation as to whether the road’s construction will continue. According to oneBBC report, “the firm had repeatedly ignored instructions and failed to meet various contractual obligations.” Speculation has also been made that Morales’ next goal is to rescind the contracts for completing the other two parts of the road, between Villa Tunari and San Ignacio de Moxos. President Morales said, “We’ve started a process to annul the road construction contract, which was granted to OAS, because the company hasn’t complied (with the terms),” according to The Chicago Tribune, which has also reported that Morales claimed that “the company had suspended work ‘without justification or authorization.'”
It is unclear whether the road project will now have the impetus to continue or whether OAS will be compensated.
Melissa Moskowitz is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.
“Over the next 10 years, the growth in the defense budget will slow, but the fact of the matter is this: It will still grow, because we have global responsibilities that demand our leadership. In fact, the defense budget will still be larger than it was toward the end of the Bush administration.”
— President Obama, speaking at the Pentagon, Jan. 5, 2012
Despite our profound indebtedness, the state of the U.S. economy, and the outcries of the Occupiers, Obama’s statement confirms fears that military spending will continue to grow over the next 10 years. In real terms, the base military budget is going to remain at levels higher than at any point during the Bush administration.
While most Americans have grown weary of our lengthy wars, influential profiteers have lobbied hard for their persistence. Although President Obama has been hailed for his diplomatic efforts by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, the themes (and consequences) of U.S. military strategy have not differed greatly from the Bush era.
This election year has been particularly telling. Employment has undoubtedly been on the forefront of American minds, and according to IPS scholar Janet Redman, “the idea of spending money overseas is entirely unpalatable to the many people who feel economically squeezed right now.” As a result, the Pentagon has scrambled to convince the public that a cut in defense would equate to enormous job loss. In October, a controversial job study by the Aerospace Industries Association was repeatedly quoted by officials concerned by the purported “million” layoffs that could occur from a decrease in the defense budget.
On the contrary, Miriam Pemberton and William Hartung have argued that “maintaining Pentagon spending at current high levels while pushing the burden of budget cuts on domestic programs would result in a net loss of jobs nationwide.” To be fair, military spending does create a lot of jobs, but more jobs are created by other sectors. Put simply, other sectors of the economy can create more jobs than the military industrial complex—and for less. Costofwar.com cites construction, education, and even home weatherization as more sustainable and stimulative industries.
President Obama has explicitly embraced national security as one of his campaign issues. For example, he has opened a joint military base with Australia in order to “play a larger and long-term role in shaping [the East Asian] region and its future.” Because this is essentially the equivalent of Russia opening up a base in Cuba during the Cold War, it’s no surprise that China has reacted negatively to the decision. It appears that the U.S. government will continue to leverage its military in order to maintain control over resources. Moves like this prove that pre-emption is still a prevailing theme of U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, preemption not only produces backlash but is also inordinately expensive.
From Australia to AFRICOM, the Pentagon continues to extend its global reach. The costs of war already far outweigh the benefits, but the way our spending looks, war will be an enduring staple of our economy. According to military researcher Nick Turse, “recently, the Army sought bids from contractors willing to supply power plants and supporting fuel systems at forward operating bases in Afghanistan for up to five years.” Withdrawal of troops seems to be a subjective term. Where is the drawdown we have been told about?
In a roundtable with young graduates, Janet Redman advised our future leaders that “it is time to realize that the world outside of the U.S. is not just a threat — it is our global community.” Our global economy desperately needs an alternative to militarization. If you are frustrated that your government is spending money on violence instead of job creation, if you are tired of elite defense contractors from the 1 percent sucking tax dollar coffers dry, if you see our “defense” system as offensive, check out demilitarize.org, and connect with activists and advocates in your area to protest.
Already, more than 130 groups in at least 39 countries are involved in the second annual Global Day of Action against Military Spending, which is set for Tuesday, April 17 — Tax Day in the United States. From street theater in Dhaka, demonstrations in Istanbul, a parliamentary debate in Yaoundé, protests against military bases in Okinawa, a peace village in Oslo, a high-level seminar at the UN in Geneva, a flash mob in Oakland, Tax Day leafleting in Bethlehem, PA, and a “walk of shame” in Washington DC, we will be occupying the global military industrial complex and advocating investments in people. Join us!
Emily Norton is an intern at the Institute of Policy Studies.