IPS Blog

Theft Is Not the Only Threat Militants Pose to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

Earlier this month the Stimson Center issued a report by George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled The Non-Unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia. The daunting title notwithstanding, the paper is not only readable for the general reader, but spellbinding for nuclear-weapons specialists. Hint: “non-unitary” in this context means a nation which fails to demonstrate a “tight, coherent line of authority” over hostilities emanating from that state — in this instance, Pakistan. Though I haven’t quite finished reading the 22-page report, the excitement it generates has spurred me to get a jump start on posting about it.

To being with, it’s doubtful that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are at serious risk of being purloined by Islamist extremist militants. At this time, the greater nuclear risk to which it’s subject, as Perkovich sees it, is the confusion that India experiences when, for example, its parliament was attacked in New Delhi in 2001 and during the Mumbai 2008 assault. Thus the nuclear deterrence model, which, according to conventional thinking [this author, for one, has his reservations], worked for the United States and Russia may not be universally applicable. Why not? Perkovich writes:

… when it comes to functions as portentous and centrally controlled as initiating and managing warfare between nuclear-armed states, it is generally assumed that a tight, coherent line of authority operates approximately in ways consistent with the unitary model. If a state is not functioning as a unitary actor, or claims not to be when it is convenient, or is not perceived to be by those who seek to deter it, the implications for deterrence stability are profound.

Specifically …

When India is attacked by actors [Islamic extremists militants] emanating from Pakistan and with ties to Pakistani intelligence services, it naturally infers that such actions represent the intentions and policies of Pakistani authorities.

The result:

The projection of violence from Pakistan [by non-state actors] into India means that deterrence (through non-nuclear means as well as nuclear) has failed to prevent aggression. The task then remains for India to threaten or undertake punishment to compel Pakistan to redress the offense and to deter Pakistan from repeating it and from escalating the conflict. If Pakistan does not [seek] to detain and prosecute the perpetrators … pressure mounts for India to demonstrate through force that it will not be deterred from escalating the conflict in self-defense.

Perkovich then provides an example of the confusion that can ensue from attacks by Pakistani non-state actors on India.

For example, while India could perceive that the terrorist attacks it attributes to Pakistan signal Pakistani aggressiveness, Pakistani leaders (and the public) [Subtle point alert! — RW] could perceive the initial terrorist attacks as a signal that the Pakistani state does not seek a wider conflict but is merely signaling resolve to press India to make political accommodations, in Kashmir or more broadly.

Trickier still …

This signaling process becomes all the more difficult and precarious if the Pakistani leaders who are presumed to be the authors of Pakistan’s signals and actions deny that the perpetrators of the conflict-triggering violence actually do manifest the policies of the state.

Why? Because …

Indian leaders then face a highly unstable dilemma. They could act as if the initial violence reflects the intentions of Pakistan’s chain of command, and send countervailing signals of retaliatory action according to normal models of deterrence, in which greater credibility and righteousness tend to reside with the defender.

This might only confuse Pakistan though. Perkovich explains.

But if Pakistani leaders [themselves] believe or claim that the perpetrators were not carrying out state policies, and India does escalate, Pakistani leaders will feel that India is the aggressor, significantly changing the dynamics of crisis and deterrence stability. “Normal” models of deterrence do not hold in such a situation.

In the end …

… disunity produces dangerous confusion and ambiguity that interfere in the management of deterrence. Who is sending signals through violence that is perceived to be emanating from the state and/or its territory? What is being signaled? … how does one manage deterrence and escalation processes in such a situation? In this latter scenario, disunity erodes the rationality on which deterrence is predicated.

This Week in OtherWords: November 28, 2012

This week, OtherWords is running three commentaries that highlight electoral milestones: African-American turnout reached record levels, marijuana-legalization ballot initiatives passed in Washington State and Colorado, and voters in a small Ohio town approved a measure declaring that “corporations are not people and money is not speech.”

We’re also distributing an op-ed by Scott Klinger, who points out that the CEOs promoting Social Security cuts have vast pensions and that American businesses have gutted their pension funds. The erosion of the nation’s private pension system makes this earned-benefit program more essential than ever.

And Sam Pizzigati’s latest column highlights his new book: The Rich Don’t Always Win. Please let me know if you would like a review copy.

Scroll down to see all our offerings and please subscribe to our weekly newsletter if you haven’t signed up yet.

  1. A Pension Deficit Disorder / Scott Klinger
    Beware of wealthy CEOs who are lecturing the rest of us about tightening our belts.
  2. The New Normal for African-American Voter Turnout / Leslie Watson Malachi
    As election law changes threatened access to the ballot box this year, African-American turnout operations strengthened.
  3. Washington and Colorado Voters Opt for a Smarter Drug Policy / Austin Robles
    Treating drug use as a criminal act rather than a health problem has harmed our society.
  4. To Move Forward, We Must Learn from Our Progressive Past / Sam Pizzigati
    Yesterday’s ideas about curbing the ultra-rich’s power remain just as relevant as ever.
  5. Shortchanging Our Future / Mattea Kramer
    Lawmakers have long underinvested in young people, and sequestration would make matters even worse.
  6. Democracy Outbreak in Ohio / Jim Hightower
    One small town is standing up to deep-pocketed campaign cash.
  7. The Sleazy League / William A. Collins
    The dark side of corporate-run schools is no longer a secret.
  8. The Ant and the Grasshopper / Khalil Bendib cartoon
The Ant and the Grasshopper, an OtherWords cartoon by Khalil Bendib

The Ant and the Grasshopper, an OtherWords cartoon by Khalil Bendib

Afghan Military Killings of American Troops Underscores Absurdity of Our Afghan Adventure

In an article for the Los Angeles Times, David Zucchino writes about the incident at Kabul International Airport in April 2011 when an Afghan Air Force colonel killed nine Americans.

The nine killings remain the single deadliest incident among insider attacks that have targeted U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. … Although insider attacks in Afghanistan are persistent — at least 80 attacks and 122 coalition deaths since 2007 — no single incident seems to have registered on the public consciousness in the United States. Few family members of those killed have spoken out.

Until now.

Widows of two of the dead officers [and] retired Air Force Lt. Col. Sally Stenton, a former civilian police investigator who was a legal officer assigned to the airport the day of the attack … have pored over a redacted Air Force report, the Central Command report and a separate Air Force chronology.

They contend that the shooter, Afghan Air Force Col. Ahmed Gul

… had help from fellow Afghan officers. … They point out that 14 Afghans were in the control room when Gul opened fire. None were killed or seriously wounded.

The U.S. Air Force investigation quoted Afghans as saying they fled or took cover when Gul opened fire. The reports, the three women said, indicated the Afghans did not attempt to rescue or treat the wounded advisors.


The three women contend that the [U.S.] Air Force failed to uncover Gul’s radicalization in Pakistan and Kabul — and the vows he made to kill Americans.

Such killings make a senseless war such as Afghanistan that much more so. Questioning the U.S. Air Force may help to make sense out of it, at least it attaches a semblance of honor to the deaths.

Meanwhile, those who lost soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq seek to make sense of their deaths by clinging to the belief that their loved ones died while defending the United States. But many of them know that the Iraq War was unjust and, even if they believe Afghanistan War was warranted, that it has passed its sell-by date. Nothing is more painful than acknowledging the truth of John Kerry’s refrain, “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die” in a war.

Should loved ones also eventually acknowledge the fruitlessness and injustice of those wars, some solace still remains. First, soldiers in any war fight, in large part, to protect (and avenge) their squad mates. Second, those who die are, in effect, occupational casualties. However quotidian it may seem, just like work itself, dying on the job has its own inherent dignity.

Iron Dome’s Effectiveness Is Not an Argument for Missile Defense

The success of Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, which has intercepted 80 to 90 percent of the rockets launched from Gaza, is viewed by many as a cause for celebration. Worse, it’s being used as evidence that missile defense works.

In fact, the odds that missile defense can protect a state from inter-continental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons are slim to nonexistent.

Equally troublesome, it’s an ongoing bone of contention between the United States and Russia. The United States seeks to implement defense systems in Europe ostensibly to protect the NATO countries from — however hypothetical — a nuclear attack by Iran.

Perhaps partly because of how preposterous the Iran pretext sounds and because it serves the purposes of the Russian defense establishment, Moscow views missile defense in Europe as an even larger affront to the stability of nuclear deterrence than missile defense on American soil. Currently, aside from a radar installation in Turkey, U.S. missile defense in Europe is deployed only on ships in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, drawing conclusions about missile defense from Iron Dome is like comparing apples and oranges. At Foreign Policy, Yousaf Butt explains.

That this small battlefield system has been so successful against the relatively slow-moving short-range rockets doesn’t mean that larger and much more expensive missile defense systems, such as the planned NATO system, will work against longer-range strategic missiles that move ten times as fast.

In other words, Iron Dome is not missile defense, it’s rocket defense (which, in fact, is also a subsection of U.S. missile defense).

In contrast to the short-range Hamas rockets, which fly through the atmosphere during their whole trajectory, the longer-range ballistic missiles … spend most of their flight in space. For decades it has been known that trying to intercept a warhead in space is exceedingly difficult because the adversary can use simple, lightweight countermeasures to fool the defensive system [such as] cheap inflatable balloon decoys.


… an 80 percent-effective tactical missile defense system against conventional battlefield rockets — such as Iron Dome — makes a lot of sense. If 10 conventional rockets are headed your way, stopping eight is undeniably a good thing. The possibility of stopping eight of 10 nuclear warheads, however, is less [impressive] since even one nuclear explosion will inflict unacceptable devastation. Just one nuclear-tipped missile penetrating your missile shield is about the equivalent of a million conventional missiles making it through.

Nor should we forget that

Even the largely successful Iron Dome system, while providing a worthy cover has not provided normalcy for Israeli citizens: the terror is still there.

The U.S. and Africa: The Next Four Years

Over the next four years the U.S. will face a number of foreign policy issues, most of them regional, some of them global. Conn Hallinan has been outlining and analyzing them. His first report covered the Middle East.

Africa is probably the single most complex region of the world and arguably its most troubled. While the world concerns itself with the Syrian civil war and the dangers it poses for the Middle East, little notice is taken of the war in the Congo, a tragedy that has taken five million lives and next to which the crisis in Syria pales.

Africa represents 15 percent of the world’s population, yet only 2.7 percent of its GDP, which is largely concentrated in only five of 49 sub-Saharan countries. Just two countries—South Africa and Nigeria—account for over 33 percent of the continent’s economic output. Life expectancy is 50 years, and considerably less in those countries ravaged by AIDS. Hunger and malnutrition are worse than they were a decade ago.

At the same time, Africa is wealthy in oil, gas, iron, aluminum and rare metals. By 2015, countries in the Gulf of Guinea will provide the U.S. with 25 percent of its energy needs, and Africa has at least 10 percent of the world’s known oil reserves. South Africa alone has 40 percent of the earth’s gold supply. The continent contains over one-third of the earth’s cobalt and supplies China—the world’s second largest economy—with 50 percent of that country’s copper, aluminum and iron ore.

But history has stacked the deck against Africa. The slave trade and colonialism inflicted deep and lasting wounds on the region, wounds that continue to bleed out in today’s world. France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal sliced up the continent without the slightest regard for its past or its people. Most of the wars that have—and are—ravaging Africa today are a direct outcome of maps drawn up in European foreign offices to delineate where and what to plunder.

But over the past decade, the world has turned upside down. Formerly the captive of the European colonial powers, China is now Africa’s largest economic partner, followed closely by India and Brazil. Consumer spending is up, and the World Bank predicts that by 2015 the number of new African consumers will match Brazil’s.

In short, the continent is filled with vibrant economies and enormous potential that is not going unnoticed in capitals throughout the world. “The question for executives at consumer packaged goods companies is no longer whether their firms should enter the region, but where and how” says a report by the management consultant agency A.T. Kearney. How Africa negotiates its new status in the world will not only have a profound impact on its people, but on the global community as well. For investors it is the last frontier.

The U.S. track record in Africa is a shameful one. Washington was a long-time supporter of the apartheid regime in South Africa and backed the most corrupt and reactionary leaders on the continent, including the despicable Mobutu Sese Seko in the Congo. As part its Cold War strategy, the U.S. aided and abetted civil wars in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. Americans have much to answer for in the region.


If there is a single characterization of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Africa, it is the increased militarization of American diplomacy on the continent. For the first time since World War II, Washington has significant military forces in Africa, overseen by a freshly minted organization, Africom.

The U.S. has anywhere from 12,000 to 15,000 Marines and Special Forces in Djibouti, a former French colony bordering the Red Sea. It has 100 Special Forces soldiers deployed in Uganda, supposedly tracking down the Lord’s Resistance Army. It actively aided Ethiopia’s 2007 invasion of Somalia, including using its navy to shell a town in the country’s south. It is currently recruiting and training African forces to fight the extremist Islamic organization, the Shabab, in Somalia, and conducting “counter-terrorism” training in Mali, Chad, Niger, Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Zambia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, and Mauretania.

Since much of the U.S. military activities involves Special Forces and the CIA, it is difficult to track how widespread the involvement is. “I think it is far larger than anyone imagines,” says John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org.

As a whole, U.S. military adventures in Africa have turned out badly. The Ethiopian invasion overthrew the moderate Islamic Courts Union, elevating the Shabab from a minor player to a major headache. NATO’s war on Libya—Africom’s coming-out party—is directly responsible for the current crisis in Mali, where Local Tuaregs and Islamic groups have seized the northern part of the country, armed with the plundered weapons’ caches of Muammar el-Qaddafi. Africom’s support of Uganda’s attack on the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo resulted in the death of thousands of civilians.

While the Obama administration has put soldiers and weapons into Africa, it has largely dropped the ball on reducing poverty. In spite of the UN’s Millennium Development plan adopted in 2000, sub-Saharan Africa will not reach the program’s goals for reducing poverty and hunger, and improving child and maternal healthcare. Rather than increasing aid, as the plan requires, the U.S. has either cut aid or used debt relief as a way of fulfilling its obligations.

At the same time, Washington has increased military aid, including arms sales. One thing Africa does not need is any more guns and soldiers.

There are a number of initiatives that the Obama administration could take that would make a material difference in the lives of hundreds of millions of Africans.

First, it could fulfill the UN’s Millennium goals by increasing its aid to 0.7 percent of its GDP, and not using debt forgiveness as part of that formula. Canceling debt is a very good idea, and allows countries to re-deploy the money they would use for debt payment to improve health and infrastructure, but as part of an overall aid package it is mixing apples and oranges.

Second, it must de-militarize its diplomacy in the region. Indeed, as Somalia and Libya illustrate, military solutions many times make bad situations worse. Behind the rubric of the “war on terror,” the U.S. is training soldiers throughout the continent. History shows, however, that those soldiers are just as likely to overthrow their civilian governments as they are to battle “terrorists.” Amadou Sanogo, the captain who overthrew the Mali government this past March and initiated the current crisis, was trained in the U.S.

There is also the problem of who are the” terrorists.” Virtually all of the groups so designated are focused on local issues. Nigeria’s Boko Haram is certainly a lethal organization, but it is the brutality of the Nigerian Army and police that fuels its rage, not al-Qaeda. The continent’s bug-a-boo, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Meghreb, is small and scattered, and represents more a point of view than an organization. Getting involved in chasing “terrorists” in Africa could end up pitting the U.S. against local insurgents in the Niger Delta, Berbers in the Western Sahara, and Tuaregs in Niger and Mali.

What Africa needs is aid and trade directed at creating infrastructure and jobs. Selling oil, cobalt, and gold brings in money, but not permanent jobs. That requires creating a consumption economy with an export dimension. But the US’s adherence to “free trade” torpedoes countries from constructing such modern economies.

Africans cannot currently compete with the huge—and many times subsidized industries—of the First World. Nor can they build up an agricultural infrastructure when their local farmers cannot match the subsidized prices of American corn and wheat. Because of those subsidies, U.S. wheat sells for 40 percent below production cost, and corn for 20 percent below. In short, African needs to “protect” their industries—much as the U.S. did in its early industrial stage—until they can establish themselves. This was the successful formula followed by Japan and South Korea.

The Carnegie Endowment and the European Commission found that “free trade” would end up destroying small scale agriculture in Africa, much as it did for corn farmers in Mexico. Since 50 percent of Africa’s GNP is in agriculture, the impact would be disastrous, driving small farmers off the land and into overcrowded cities where social services are already inadequate.

The Obama administration should also not make Africa a battleground in its competition with China. Last year US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described China’s trading practices with Africa as a “new colonialism,” a sentiment that is not widely shared on the continent. A Pew Research Center study found that Africans were consistently more positive about China’s involvement in the region than they were about the U.S.’s.

Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa, recently praised the continent’s “relationship with China,” but also said that the “current trade pattern” is unsustainable because it was not building up Africa’s industrial base. China recently pledged $20 billion in aid for infrastructure and agriculture.

One disturbing development is a “land rush” by countries ranging from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia to acquire agricultural land in Africa. With climate change and population growth, food, as Der Spiegel puts it, “is the new oil.” Land is plentiful in Africa, and at about one-tenth the cost in the U.S. Most production by foreign investors would be on an industrial scale, with its consequent depletion of the soil and degradation of the environment from pesticides and fertilizers. The Obama administration should adopt the successful “contract farming” model, where investors supply capital and technology to small farmers, who keep ownership of their land and are guaranteed a set price for their products. This would not only elevate the efficiency of agriculture, it would provide employment for local people.

The Obama administration should also strengthen, not undermine, regional organizations. The African Union tried to find a peaceful resolution to the Libyan crisis because its members were worried that a war would spill over and destabilize countries surrounding the Sahara. The Obama administration and NATO pointedly ignored the AU’s efforts, and the organization’s predictions have proved prescient.

Lastly, the Obama administration should join with India and Brazil and lobby for permanent membership for an African country—either South Africa or Nigeria, or both— in the UN Security Council. India and Brazil should also be given permanent seats. Currently the permanent members of the Security Council are the victors of WW II: the U.S., Russia, China, France and Great Britain.

In 1619, a Dutch ship dropped anchor in Virginia and exchanged its cargo of Africans for food, thus initiating a trade that would rip the heart out of a continent. No one really knows how many Africans were forcibly transported to the New World, but it was certainly in the tens of millions. To this day Africa mirrors the horror of the slave trade and the brutal colonial exploitation that followed in its wake. It is time to make amends.

For more of Conn Hallinan’s essays visit Dispatches From the Edge. Meanwhile, his novels about the ancient Romans can be found at The Middle Empire Series.

Once Again, Israel Comes Out on the Short End Politically of a Military Offensive

Cross-posted from the Colorado Progressive Jewish News

Whatever It Is Called – Operation Pillar of Clouds, or Perhaps, More Accurately, ‘Operation Killing Hope’ … It Failed

The expropriation of Palestinian lands by Israel since 1948.

The expropriation of Palestinian lands by Israel since 1948.

The end of the latest U.S.-supported Israeli air and sea war against Gaza has triggered a global call for immediate comprehensive peace negotiations that would include an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories seized in 1967, the creation of a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with its capital in East Jerusalem, and security guarantees for Israel within its pre-June 1967 borders. Not exactly a new framework, but one that is viable, that will end – or certainly seriously reduce – the cycle of violence, and that will produce a peace with justice.

There might be a ceasefire, broadly welcomed, but little momentum to follow up on it with a serious peace process yet despite the appeals. In the end, either the Israelis and Palestinians will move towards peace or towards another round of war. There is no in-between. Nor will the window for peace-making be open forever.

A global consensus supporting the above framework is still broadly supported. But given U.S. virtually blind support for Israel since 1967 – but most especially in Israel’s three recent wars (2006 Lebanon invasion, 2008 Gaza invasion, 2012 air and naval assault on Gaza), it becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to claim its position as a unbiased broker in such a process. It will take some doing therefore, not only to get Israel to the negotiating table, but to get the United States to play a more constructive role in such a process. Still there is a ray of hope. Isn’t it time to draw the logical conclusion: that military solutions have run their course and will, in the future, fail and that the conflict between Israel and Palestine can only be resolved politically, through a negotiated settlement based on United Nations resolutions?

If not the cycle of violence will continue. Each time it gets more severe, more difficult from spinning out of control as nearly happened this time. That being the case, the logical thing would be for the parties involved to announce the re-establishing of a negotiating process on all the outstanding issues – final status negotiations – and to move consciously and persistently in that direction. Needless to say, this is not the thinking either in Israel, nor from all appearances in Washington D.C. In Israel, more than 70% of those surveyed would have wanted to see the Israeli Defense Force launch a ground invasion of Gaza. In Washington D.C., as in the past and perhaps even more so, there is no political will to press Israel to the negotiating table and keep it there until an agreement is reached. Instead, Israel is re-armed and drawn ever more closely into U.S.-NATO regional strategic war-making plans.

A War With No Winners, Now and in the Future

The NBC online headline reads “After Eight Days of Gaza Violence, Israel Declares ‘Mission Accomplished,’ Hamas Claims Victory.” A bit odd, no? Both sides claim victory? That is not even a half truth. This was, if anything, a war with no winners; given the mismatch in firepower, the fact that the eight-day Israeli air and sea offensive ended in something of a stalemate, and that Israel could not secure a clear-cut military and political victory will be seen as a political victory for Hamas, which it was.

Despite its post-cease fire blustering, Israel got a dose of its own medicine this time, as Palestinian rockets were able to penetrate as far north from Gaza as Tel Aviv and near Jerusalem. The human and property damage Israel suffered, was, compared to the Palestinians, minor (five dead, some property damage), but the psychological shock of Gaza-based missiles landing in major population centers was considerable. It was most probably was a key factor (among many) in Netanyahu not launching a ground war against Gaza. True, Israel’s missile defense system did neutralize about a third of incoming missiles, but two-thirds of them landed.

Israel’s well-worn tactic of playing ‘the victim card’ to somehow cover its role as aggressor is losing its potency. Once again Israel’s ‘precision bombing’ was not very precise. The photos of the victims bely Israeli and Obama Administration contentions that Israel was engaged in a ‘defensive war’. Images of children being torn to pieces, of three generations of Palestinian families bombed to smithereens, of hospitals targeted as well as foreign media outlets (AP, Al Jazeera) do not correspond to a nation ‘defending itself’ from ‘outside aggression. Just the opposite.

The pictures of the human suffering its residents endured, downplayed by the U.S. media but readily available all over the worldwide web, are heartbreaking. A day after it was agreed upon, the ceasefire appears to be holding. Gaza is smoldering but its residents unbowed. Hamas was not weakened by this Israeli attack; rather its prestige has soared, not only among Palestinians but globally. Still, for the second time in four years, Gazans paid a heavy, punishing price.

An incomplete damage report, collected from various sources, just before the ceasefire went into effect, reveals the following:

• At least 145 Palestinians have been killed in IOF attacks on the Gaza Strip. Of those, 29 were children and 12 women. More than 1100 people were wounded, including 326 children and 162 women. At least 865 houses have also been damaged or destroyed, including 92 completely. Of those 92 houses, 44 were directly attacked; including 33 deliberately targeted by direct Israeli attacks using the roof-knocking tactic. Expect all of these statistics to spike somewhat upwards.

• Another 179 houses sustained serious damages. Threats to cut off electrical and water sources did not materialize, but the infrastructure of both suffered once again.

• At this writing, Israeli attacks caused damages to 6 health centers, 30 schools, 2 universities, 15 NGO offices, 27 mosques, 14 media offices, 11 industrial plants, 81 commercial stores, 1 UNRWA food distribution Center, 7 ministry offices, 14 police/security stations, 5 banks, 30 vehicles, and 2 youth clubs. Because of the bombing, some 10,000 Gazans were forced to find shelter from the bombing at U.N.- run schools.

Despite the damage Israel inflicted, militarily, the clash, was something akin to a draw. Politically, regardless of the spin, Israel lost. Now, with U.S. aid, it hopes to recoup politically (through pressure on Egypt) what it failed to accomplish through the F-16-delivered (not very) precision missiles. The Israeli military, by many estimates the world’s fourth largest, was held at bay by what is little more than a rag-tag militia of Hamas defenders with a few short range and (perhaps) anti-tank missiles.

Netanyahu Miscalculated

Netanyahu, itching to launch a major ground assault to punish the Gazans yet again, was forced to put the brakes on such an operation, which entailed too many risks for Israel, the United States, and, strange as it might appear, even a Muslim-brotherhood led Egypt. The ostensible goal of the Israeli assault was to knock out Hamas’ missile capacity, but other factors were at play. Yes, as has been well publicized, on some level Netanyahu hoped to isolate and marginalize his opponents vying for political power in the upcoming Israeli elections.

He also calculated that regardless of how the military operations played out, that it would complicate life for Barack Obama whose re-election Netanyahu shamelessly lobbied against. At the same time, the Israeli prime minister hoped to embarrass and humiliate the Egyptian government, by forcing it to choose between its strategic alliance with the U.S. and the will of the Egyptian people to stand up to Israel.

But the central political goal of this campaign was to kill hope, Palestinian hope that in this, Obama’s second term, there might be a possibility of diplomatic progress towards achieving a political settlement that would lead to a viable West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. Through a full scale assault – air, sea and with a follow-up ground offensive, Israel intended to strike a crushing blow to the Palestinians once again, to complicate any effort at Palestinian unity, to continue building settlements in West Bank and ultimately to ‘send a message’ that Israel is in control and that there will be no Palestinian state. The occupation would continue as it has since 1967.

A combination of world public opinion fast turning against both Israel and the United States, U.S. pressure on Netanyahu (with its promises of lucrative consolation prize payoffs to Netanyahu), Hamas’ dogged resistance, and Israeli worries that Hamas possibly had anti-tank missiles all merged to end the Israel air and sea offensive and Hamas’ missile response. The Israeli ground offensive never happened.

The Shadow of the 2006 Israeli Military Incursion Into Lebanon Hangs Over Gaza

In many ways how this conflict was fought – and ended – was in large measure dictated by the 2006 Israeli venture into the Lebanon which was, by any objective standard, not just a political but also a military failure in what has been referred to as ‘asymmetrical’ warfare. The limits of Israeli military might were exposed. It might be able to fight a conventional war against another regional power, but is far less prepared to fight the kind of guerilla warfare of the kind that Hezbollah and now Hamas practice. Israel suffered one of its greatest military losses then, its ground offensive stalled as Hezbollah anti-tank missiles disabled several score of Israeli tanks leading the charge into southern Lebanon.

Forced to withdraw its ground troops, Israel responded with a punishing – but largely ineffective – massive air offensive. Hezbollah’s answer was a massive missile attack on northern Israel which forced more than 100,000 Israelis to abandon their homes and seek temporary shelter elsewhere. As will be the case with Hamas today, in 2006 Hezbollah emerged from that war a much stronger force than it had been, not just in Lebanon, but throughout the region.

While in 2008, Israel was able to launch a punishing military offensive against Gaza, this time one might say that it ‘won’ militarily but actually lost politically. That military offensive was little more than an air, sea and ground-based massacre. To call it a war is to mis-characterize what was little more than unprovoked aggression. It did not achieve its goal of eliminating Hamas, which was able to rebuild its structures, cadres and military potential rather quickly. Although Israelis and their U.S. supporters howled against the charges of ‘war crimes’, the moral stain remained. Israel’s prestige in the world – and among American Jewry somewhat – plummeted.

With this current attack on Gaza, Israel’s international standing, despite U.S. support, will continue to tank.

This is the third time in a mere six years that Israel has come out on the short end politically from wars that it has launched. All three times, Israeli military operations have been launched with full support from Washington – be it the Bush or Obama Administrations – and with an ample supply of U.S. made sophisticated weaponry. All three times the thin pretext of ‘Israel’s right to self-defense’ was invoked for what were rather wars of aggression launched on the thinnest of pretexts.

While here in the United States, with the public bombarded with pro-Israeli, anti-Palestinian media spin, the Israeli offensive enjoyed popular support. This was not so in the rest of the world where images of the wanton destruction and killing of Palestinians began to inflame anti-Israeli sentiment everywhere. Outside of the U.S. the argument that ‘Israel has the right to defend itself’ – while somehow the Palestinians don’t have that right – rings surprisingly hollow.

The Forgotten Occupation

For all practical purposes, given the unbalance of power and the oft forgotten fact that Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem are territories illegally occupied by Israel, seized by force in 1967, what took place in Gaza and Israel was not a war. It was rather an attempt by a colonial occupying power, Israel, to yet again strengthen its hold on a colonized – and brutalized – people. While much of the world yearns to see the cycle of violence on both sides end, once one leaves the borders of the continental United States, there are very few voices who would deny the Palestinians the right to defend themselves, as they did this last week in Gaza.

After the 2006 and 2008 Israeli military adventures, the U.S. Congress, speedily and amply provided replacement weaponry throwing in hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Tel Aviv to boot, this above and beyond the annual $3 billion gift. The just-ending Israel attack on Gaza will follow suit. All indications are that Hillary Clinton, with perhaps her 2016 presidential on the line, did not so much ‘negotiate’ a cease fire as she did pay for it, doling out tens if not hundreds of billions to both Israel and Egypt.

Reports have already surfaced that American financial largess – once again – coaxed Israel to accept a ceasefire and Egypt to press Hamas to do likewise. This is the modern American form of diplomacy – buying its way to unstable peace – otherwise known as bribery – whether it is paying Poland $8 billion to join NATO, or ‘brokering’ a cease fire over Gaza. Months before the fighting broke out the United States gave Israel two gifts, one of $270 million and another of $70 million to upgrade its early warning missile defense system. Promises of additional financial aid to Israel – just the opposite message needed to bring Israel to the negotiating table – are already in the offing. Likewise tremendous pressure combined with financial incentives were put upon Egypt to use its influence on Hamas to accept the cease fire.

How to Change Course.

On a radio program where I participated a few days ago (Hemispheres – KGNU-Boulder), one of the participants spoke about how the Middle East has been marred with religious conflict for the past 5,000 years. This is utter nonsense, a way simply to avoid putting forth concrete suggestions for ending the crisis by taking the fatalistic and entirely inaccurate position that the conflict is essentially unsolvable. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a modern political conflict with its roots in the late 19th century; it is primarily not even a religious but a national and colonial conflict.

In his column today, University of Michigan prof Juan Cole offers what he calls ‘10 Steps that are necessary to lasting Israeli-Gaza Peace‘. They include a call for lifting the Israeli blockade of Gaza which continues to choke the Palestinians there, the granting of Palestinians citizenship and statehood, encouraging Egypt to help with Palestinian rapproachment between Hamas and Fateh, encouraging Egypt to press Hamas to renounce terror as a tool for national struggle, renewed Palestinian elections to create a government of national unity, a moratorium on Israeli West Bank settlement building (the main stumbling block to any successful negotiation), the end of Israeli expropriation of property in East Jerusalem and Israel recognizing the right of Palestinians to have their capital in East Jerusalem, Israel not insisting on recognition by its negotiating partners as a pre-condition for starting talks, an Israeli-Palestinian return to the bargaining table for final status talks, and finally that the United States must stop blocking UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel.

Taken together if implemented, would mark a shift in gears, from war-making to peace-making. It would be a shame, that after this hard won cease fire, if the situation again deteriorated into another war, which could – as this one nearly did – draw in the whole region, if not the world. With such high stakes, peace really is the only option.

U.S. Using Bad Info for Drone Strikes Like It Did for Detainees

As when the United States greased the skids for war with Iraq, it’s ratcheting up tensions with Iran by disseminating misinformation about nuclear weapons. The United States has also failed to learn from other mistakes in the Iraq, as well as Afghanistan.

Remember how the United States offered rewards to the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq for intelligence on insurgents? That only resulted in populating prisons such as Bagram and Guantánamo with legions of innocents. It seems that in their haste to unearth terrorists, the U.S. military and the CIA had failed to vet their informants. With an eye for the main chance, Iraqis and Afghans saw informing as a way both to cash in and rid their communities of neighbors who’d crossed them, for whatever reason. no matter how trivial.

Using an occupying army to assist you in ridding yourself of local enemies is a time-(dis)honored tradition. One would think that, by this point in history, the military and intelligence agencies would be alert to manipulation. Presumably a perceived need for live bodies to fill quotas over-rode their wariness. Now we see this mistake repeated in designating drone-strike targets.

The landmark report Living Under Drones, released in September by the Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, quotes author Tom Junod. In a piece for the August Esquire titled The Lethal Presidency of Barack Obama, he wrote (emphasis added):

The US detained the “worst of the worst” in Guantánamo for years before releasing six hundred of them, uncharged, which amounts to the admission of a terrible mistake. The Lethal Presidency is making decisions to kill based on intelligence from the same sources. These decisions are final, and no one will ever be let go.

By “decisions to kill,” Junod means drone strikes. Not only is the CIA using bogus intel for drone strikes as it and the military did to net terrorist suspects, it may also be paying Pakistanis to mark houses as targets by depositing computer chips nearby. In addition, GPS’s are attached to cars to turn them, too, into drone fodder.

The report also quotes Clive Stafford Smith writing for the Guardian.

Just as with Guantanamo Bay, the CIA is paying bounties to those who will identify “terrorists.” Five thousand dollars is an enormous sum for a Waziri informant, translating to perhaps £250,000 in London terms. The informant has a calculation to make: is it safer to place a GPS tag on the car of a truly dangerous terrorist, or to call down death on a Nobody (with the beginnings of a beard), reporting that he is a militant? Too many “militants” are just young men with stubble.

Smith reveals another dynamic. Imagine that a Pakistani who contacts the CIA isn’t motivated by the desire to avenge a neighbor for failing to pay back a loan, or something similar. If he’s only in it for the money, why risk fingering a Taliban commander? If discovered, he and perhaps his family would find themselves on the murderous end of Taliban revenge.

To give the CIA some wiggle room, perhaps it assumes it won’t be provided with bogus info because potential informants would fear the CIA demand return of the money if the lead turned out to be false or that it would even detain them. But, as the NYU-Stanford report indicates, the CIA or U.S. military rarely investigate the aftermath of drone strikes to determine whether civilians were killed.

Perhaps then the CIA assumes that informants would be loath to turn in innocents for fear of reprisal from the families of those killed. When deciding who to finger, though, informants may be targeting victims whose families lack the wherewithal to take revenge. Or, with what, in effect, is an astronomical sum to them, informants may factor in paying retribution money to the families of those killed.

The longer this type of cynical use of indigenous peoples continues, the further one’s respect for the CIA diminishes.

American Jews Still Reject Zionism at Their Own Risk

Cross-posted from Progressive Avenues.

In the 1940’s and 50’s, I was raised on the North Shore of Chicago, in a suburb named Glencoe. The town was at least 95% Jewish, and everyone knew who the 3 black families were, knew the handful of Christians and “others” who resided near us. We understood that we comprised one of the wealthiest, fanciest Jewish ghettos in the United States, and perhaps the world. The great majority of us went to temple at the North Shore Congregation Israel, and donated $5.00 a shot for stickers to purchase “trees” to plant in the new State of Israel. We were going to transform the desert into a promised land and help the oppressed Jews of Europe to create a homeland where pogroms, ghettos and the Holocaust were a thing of the past. For literally decades, Zionists had perpetuated the myth that the territory that would become the State of Israel was “a land without a people, for a people without a land.” How noble and just it all seemed.

If anyone would have asked us why we were planting trees in Israel, when the Holy Land was already covered with Olive trees planted by Arab families for more than 5 centuries, we would have accused them of rank anti-semitism. If someone had suggested that we were purchasing guns, and missiles, instead of agricultural tools, we would have fought them on the spot. Yet history judges us harshly and we now have a reckoning to deal with.

I represented men and women on death row in California for over 25 years. All of the defendants on death row, without exception, were brutalized as young children, either by their parents, or their community. The great majority of prisoners were victims of brutality, and they responded to the society that brutalized them by killing in return.

One would have expected that those who were brutalized as children would have recognized how horrible the experience was and rejected such behavior when it was their turn to have authority over others. But that is simply not so. Humans, unfortunately, by and large, grow up to perpetrate the same atrocities that were perpetrated upon them against those they are close to. While this phenomenon is not universal, it is so common as to be the expectation for law enforcement and the society at large. Children of convicts are expected to become criminals when they grow up, and the society does everything in its power to ensure that that expectation is met. Young black children in this country have to be saints to stay out of reformatories and prisons. One out of three black people in the United States are in prison or on parole.

So, too, do we watch this phenomenon being tragically repeated in the State of Israel. One would expect that a people who had been subjected to the atrocities of World War II, to the Holocaust, to the discrimination and slaughter perpetrated against the Jews, would be the first nation on earth to oppose a similar oppression against others. Yet, the sad reality is that the racism and violence perpetrated against Palestinians in the State of Israel is outlandish and inexcusable.

Gaza is nothing short of a concentration camp. Children are starving there and Israel will kill any individual or group that attempts to bring food or water into that land. Israel is the last country on the face of the earth that has dared to impose a formal state of apartheid against an indigenous population. Israeli checkpoints are the precise duplicates of what the Nazi checkpoints at the borders of the ghettos looked like in 1938 Germany. The excuses and rationalizations used by Israel to perpetuate this oppression against the Palestinian people are precisely those used by the Nazis: Palestinians pose a threat to the security of the nation; they will steal jobs and security from the rightful people of the nation; they are untrustworthy, and owe no allegiance to the nation. The parallels are terrifying.

That this should be the situation in 2012 is so pathetic as to be comical in an historical context. The anti-semitism of the prevailing nations of World War II, the United States and Great Britain was so profound as to obviate the possibility that Jews would be permitted to immigrate or seek sanctuary in either of those victorious countries. The Christian majorities of those countries so hated the Jews that allowing them to seek sanctuary in either country was out of the question.

Instead, anti-semitic nations decided to give the Jews who survived the Holocaust land that belonged to the Palestinians. Kill two birds with one stone. Keep Jews out of the U.S. and Great Britain, and give them the land of a bunch of Muslims that, according to the U.S. and Great Britain, were little more than savages. Certainly, the Western powers could control any opposition the local population might put up to prevent the Jews from entering the new state of Israel. It would be a walk in the park for these countries to disenfranchise the Palestinian people, who had lived on the land for centuries. The fact that Jews had lived in Palestine for centuries without undergoing the sort of atrocities perpetrated by European Christians upon them was quickly overlooked. Give us our land, said the Zionists, and we will take care of the rest.

So now, we are confronted with the situation where there is not a Muslim on the face of the earth that does not see Israel’s occupation of the Holy Land as an unjustified invasion of their land. The only difference between this and the initial colonization of the United States of America, is that, unlike what happened to the American Indians, Caucasians, whether Christian or Jewish, have not been able to eradicate sufficient numbers of indigenous people to take over the land without opposition. The Muslims have not acceded to the colonial expansion of the “settlers” in Israel, to the U.S. demand for expansion of the militarist Israeli state, or to the eradication of those who inhabited the land before the Jews arrived.

In virtually every temple and Jewish Community Center in the United States, Israel is seen as “the good guy” in the Middle East, and the Arabs are seen as devils. The impact this has had on Jews in the United States is to divide the community into two totally distinct communities: those who are Zionists and those who identify with being Jewish, but reject the racism and violence perpetrated by Israel against the entire Muslim world. It is impossible for Jews who take pride in their heritage, to participate in their own communities without endorsing the atrocities perpetrated by Israel against Arabs throughout the world. Jews who reject Zionism are outcasts in the established Jewish communities. They have no base and no community. We are either anti-Muslim or invisible. We are left with no alternatives within the broader community.

The U.S. is perfectly content to let Israel serve as the buffer between hostile Arab nations and U.S. imperialism. After all, it is the Jews who are fighting Muslims on a daily basis, not Americans. But once the State of Israel is defeated because of its bellicose intransigence and intolerance to those with whom they should be sharing the land, Jews everywhere will suffer the consequences and be at risk. One could not write a more ironical conclusion. Non-Zionist Jews are like the non-existent Left in the United States – we are simply not included in the debates of our nation or among our people; and, because Zionists permit no rational debates or discussions, they are without a clue as to the international implications of their cruelty toward the Palestinian peoples. The world will not put up with this indefinitely. It is just a matter of time.

Luke Hiken is an attorney who has engaged in the practice of criminal, military, immigration, and appellate law.

This Week in OtherWords: November 21, 2012

This week, OtherWords is running two “fiscal cliff” commentaries. Guest columnist Mattea Kramer makes the case for deep, yet targeted military spending cuts while Marian Wright Edelman calls for restraint when it comes to scaling back programs that serve children. We will continue to feature under-debated angles of the growing conversation about how to balance the nation’s budget and avoid what could prove a “fiscal swindle.”

Scroll down to see all our offerings. I encourage you to visit the OtherWords blog, where we are running a special Thanksgiving post from Jim Hightower. And please subscribe to our weekly newsletter if you haven’t signed up yet.

  1. Name that Foreign Policy Legacy / John Feffer
    Under Obama’s leadership, Washington is finally coming to terms with the world’s multipolarity.
  2. Will the Supreme Court Dismantle the Voting Rights Act? / Raul A. Reyes
    Widespread efforts to suppress voting by people of color and the poor through a rash of voter ID laws make it clear that we still need the landmark 1965 legislation today.
  3. Don’t Cut Our Kids Out of the Budget / Marian Wright Edelman
    America’s security and prosperity depend on our children’s ability to drive the economy of the future.
  4. The Classy Election of 2012 / Steve Cobble
    Big ideas can change voting patterns.
  5. Another Side of Inequality / Sam Pizzigati
    A vast gulf between the rich and the rest of us is incompatible with democracy.
  6. The Real Problem with Military Spending / Mattea Kramer
    The Pentagon’s budget has plenty of fat, but cuts need to be targeted.
  7. Bosses Gone Berserk / Jim Hightower
    Papa John’s and other employers are punishing their workers for Obama’s win.
  8. Our Endless State of War / William A. Collins
    As long as it’s fought by other people on someone else’s soil, Americans can live with perpetual conflict.
  9. Voting Rights Appeal / Khalil Bendib Cartoon
Voting Rights Appeal, an OtherWords cartoon by Khalil Bendib

Voting Rights Appeal, an OtherWords cartoon by Khalil Bendib

Serbia’s Future: Back to the Past

Cross-posted from JohnFeffer.com. John is currently traveling in Eastern Europe and observing its transformations since 1989.

Sonia Biserko.

Sonia Biserko.

The war in Yugoslavia began as a conflict over state structure. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nationalist movements in the republics championed greater autonomy only to be suppressed in turn by Tito, who then went on to incorporate many of their demands in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic signaled his intentions to assert Serbian dominance within the federation by removing the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. When I was in the region the following year, debate raged over the nature of the Yugoslav federation: should it be a loose confederation, a more democratic federation, or a state in which Serbia reigned first among equals.

In 1990, Sonja Biserko was in the very middle of these debates. She was working in the Yugoslav foreign ministry at the time, an ideal vantage point for witnessing the disintegration of the federation. She ultimately resigned her position and embarked on a career in human rights through the organization she founded, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. As one of the early critics of Milosevic, she has also been resolute in her critique of Serbian nationalism. She worked to document war crimes and promote dialogue with Kosovo. These positions were not popular, to the say the least, among right-wing extremists and their more mainstream supporters, but Biserko has bravely continued to speak her mind.

She points out that Milosevic and his team were fundamentally anti-institutional and relied on the power of the mob. “This was how they destroyed not only the Yugoslav federation and its institutions but also Serbian institutions,” she points out. “We are now still living in this provisional state. We don’t have a modern state.” Serbia, in other words, is still struggling with the legacy of Milosevic. And the same policies that tore apart the federal structure of Yugoslavia are now threatening Serbia itself, as Belgrade treats provinces like Vojvodina much as it did the republics of Slovenia and Croatia during the Milosevic era.

Biserko does not mince words about what Serbia must do to change course. First of all, Serbians have to grapple with the nationalist project, spelled out back in 1986 in an infamous memo from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science, which contributed so much to the war and suffering of the 1990s. “In order to put the region in order, Serbia has the most homework to do,” she says. “Other countries also have homework to do, but they won’t do it until they see that Serbia has started the process. This doesn’t mean putting Serbia in a corner. But we should know, especially the young generation, why it happened. People have to understand what was behind all this.”

We were talking on a warm Saturday afternoon in late September in one of the many cafes of the Terazije, the pedestrian concourse that runs through the middle of Belgrade. Not far from our café was an apartment where three key figures of the Serbian nationalist revival met on a regular basis – the novelist Dobrica Cosic, the painter Mića Popović, and the literary critic Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz – as chronicled in The Nonconformists, a 2007 book by historian Nick Miller. These figures, particularly Cosic, were influential in shaping the “nationalist project” that Milosevic adopted, that continues to influence Serbian state policy, and that Sonja Biserko has made her life’s work to deconstruct, both in theory and practice.

The Interview

Let’s start by talking about the debates around state structure that took place just prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia. There was considerable disagreement about whether Yugoslavia should function as a federation or a confederation.

After the Second World War it was not possible for Yugoslavia to function as a federation because of the pressure coming from the East, from Moscow. The country was really isolated at that point, so there was no space for this concept of federation to truly function. After Stalin’s death, and the relaxation of tensions between the two blocs, these processes within Yugoslavia started to evolve. From the 1960s onward, Yugoslavia began to function as a real federation.

Serbs, however, never accepted these developments because they perceived Yugoslavia as an enlarged Serbia. Any effort to make other people equal or to make their national agenda work in a different way from Belgrade’s caused tensions in the federation. Then, in the 1980s, after Tito’s death, Serbia attempted to redesign Yugoslavia according to its own perceptions, which meant a recentralization of the country.

This was the real reason behind the war — the concept of the state. It became a choice between a loose confederation or federation on the one hand and a highly centralized state according to Serbia’s concept on the other. This was the background not only to the war but also today behind the tensions in Serbia. Serbia lost Kosovo because it was not able to manage the situation there according to the democratic principles already built into the Yugoslav federation. In 1989, Serbia removed autonomy for both Vojvodina and Kosovo, and with Kosovo we know how it ended.

And now we now have this tension between Novi Sad and Belgrade. The Serbian Progressive Party, which is currently in power, is trying to remove what little autonomy that the Tadic government gave Vojvodina over the last four years. It’s not only the Progressive Party. This attitude is common among most of the political parties here in Serbia, but the Progressive Party really radicalized the situation immediately after it took over. There is a growing block in Vojvodina opposing this approach, especially because the current government is now changing local results. The Democratic Party and the Socialist Party agreed to a coalition after the recent election, and they created local authorities in Vojvodina immediately after the local elections. And now the Progressive Party is totally redesigning the local results. They already took over the Novi Sad assembly and their intention is to take over as many other places as possible, wherever the ruling party can make coalition with the Socialists and other parties.

This concept of state structure is now destroying Serbia itself. It’s preventing Serbia from becoming a modern state based on democratic values and principles along the lines of European countries.

In the 1980s was the first attack on Yugoslavia when Serbia removed the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The idea was to recentralize Serbia, and the other republics allowed that because they thought Serbia’s appetite would be satisfied. After Tito died, Serbia raised the question of the revision of the 1974 constitution, which gave greater autonomy to the republics. Serbia had the army on its side, because the Yugoslav army thought that only a centralized government could preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia and guarantee the survival of socialism as a system. This is where Serbia and the army converged. Later, it developed into a disaster for the whole region.

In 1989, Serbia changed its constitution, which was contrary to the principle of consensual change. Serbia was the first republic to challenge the 1974 constitution, even though later they always blamed Slovenia and Croatia for being secessionist republics. But, in fact, the first step was taken by Serbia. In article 1, section 33 of the Serbian constitution, there is a provision saying that Serbia will act on its own against the federal constitution if it doesn’t conform to Serbian national interest.

In the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences that was revealed in 1986, the authors also in a way come up with this same argumentation. The memo consists of two parts. One part is a critical assessment of the economy. And the other part of the memorandum is about the position and interests of the Serb nation in Yugoslavia. This was a kind of blueprint for the whole program of Milosevic, and it influenced what happened later on. It started out in the very narrow intellectual circles at the Serbian Academy. In the cultural sphere a lot of books and plays and so on condensed these Serb grievances within Yugoslavia — how much Serbs sacrificed, how much they were victimized, all this sort of thing. Every nation, of course, has its grievances. But this was exploited here to such an extent that every Serb in the country absorbed this narrative and was conditioned for what came later. They were conditioned not to protest but to defend the Serbian nation throughout Yugoslavia against a possible genocide at the end of the 20th century. That was the mindset of most of the Serbian population at that time. But it really started already in the 1980s through culture, and in the informal cafe society.

From 1988 this approach was launched through the media, especially electronic media. Media, which was centralized here, especially focused on these issues through the main news program at 7 p.m., which lasted sometimes for two hours. The poisoning of the Serb nation was really constant, almost on a daily basis. Once Milosevic started the war there was no opposition to it. It was said that the fascist Ustasa was coming in Croatia, that Islamic fundamentalism was coming in Bosnia, that terrorism was coming from Kosovo. They had prepared a story for each specific region.

Throughout the federal government — I was part of the federal foreign ministry at the time – you could already see how this all functioned. The Serbian side started this enormous propaganda campaign, especially in Europe but also in America, against the “Ustasa” as soon as Franjo Tudjman came to power in Croatia. Of course, Serbs were already conditioned to be against Croatia’s new government because of this propaganda. And of course Tudjman moved immediately to change the constitution, just like the Slovenes, anticipating possible separation should things go the other way. But as I said, Serbia already did this first. Even today, you can’t convince people that Serbia was the first to change the constitution and that this was the first step in the destruction of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav federation was a very complicated state, which really needed mature and flexible leadership in all the republics. The decisions were based on consensus, and it was extremely important to have this compromise formula at all times. Serbia disturbed this formula, first by removing autonomy for both Vojvodina and Kosovo, though these regions were both constitutional parts of the federation.

I don’t know how much you followed the Milosevic trial at The Hague. Geoffrey Nice, the deputy prosecutor, was very skillful in showing how the Serbian side manipulated who was in charge: whether it was the Yugoslav army that took the first step to go against Yugoslavia or whether it was the Serbian leadership that was behind it. It was very difficult to prove because Milosevic was president of Serbia at that time while the army was a Yugoslav institution. Milosevic also brought in the best people from Serbia, legal experts from law schools, from the academy and so on. It was a struggle over interpretation. Milosevic claimed that people have the right to self-determination, not republics. This issue was quite unclear in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. After the Hague conference failed in October 1991, the Badinter commission eventually cleared up this ambiguity. It opted for republics. But during the course of the war, and in the court later at The Hague, Milosevic was always arguing that it was the people’s right to self-determination, therefore if Croats decided to leave Yugoslavia, then Serbs in Croatia had the right to leave Croatia.

When I talked to people in Slovenia, in particular, in 1990 before the declaration of independence, they were saying that they wanted a confederation. And I said, “What does a confederation mean? Technically, you already have a confederation, so what is your different conception of a confederation?” When I pushed them, it ultimately turned out that they didn’t have a different conception of confederation. They simply wanted a separate state, but in 1990 they couldn’t express it in those terms.

Also at that time – and I was working with all these people in the foreign ministry – I think that most of the republics were not preparing for the war. Some in the federal institutions — in the army, for instance — understood that something was coming up. But what also was as relevant in judging their arguments for more confederation was the European orientation at that time. In 1991, there was a resolution in the federal assembly about Yugoslavia’s integration into Europe, which nobody talks about. We in the Yugoslav foreign ministry made a draft of this resolution, which was sent to the parliament, and it was passed. Slovenia was behind it; Serbia was against it. The general secretary of the Council of Europe was present at that session. But now it’s just forgotten. That was 1991. Very soon after, the whole thing blew up.

Behind all this were also very different perceptions of values and goals. Yugoslavia was a non-aligned country. We had a very important geostrategic position. We were neutral between east and west and between north and south. Our profile in the non-aligned world was very high, and it is still very respected even today. Vuk Jeremic, Serbia’s foreign minister in the Tadic years, went to the non-aligned world and got support for postponing Kosovo’s independence, because the countries there still saw Tito and Yugoslavia as something valuable. Yugoslavia was the first European country to give a hand to these countries. When these countries supported Jeremic, it had nothing to do with Serbia and everything to do with this image of Yugoslavia. Many members of my generation grew up with this perception of Yugoslavia as an important, independent country that had its own values. There was some pride attached to being Yugoslav, especially by intellectual circles in the West that perceived Yugoslavia as an experiment in self-government and so on. In the East, liberal elites were looking at Yugoslavia as an example for what might happen in their countries. They considered Yugoslavia a dreamland at that time

There were many scholars at our universities who wrote very emotional books in the 1990s. People were taking sides. There was the Korcula Summer School. There was the Praxis group. The Serbian branch of the Praxis group was very demagogic and very dogmatic. They were more radical than the government itself.

Mihailo Markovic – the man in charge of ideology under Milosevic — was in the Praxis group.

The Serbians split from the Croatian group because of this dogmatism. There is a study by Nick Miller called The Nonconformists that I read recently. It’s about three Serbian nationalist figures who met in an apartment not far from here near Studentski Trg: the novelist Dobrica Cosic, the painter Mića Popović, and the literary critic Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz. They considered themselves dissidents, opponents of Tito. They hated Tito. It was not because of socialism. It was personal dislike. And they thought that Serbs not Croats should dominate the country. They presented themselves as fighters for freedom of speech. But when we ended up with freedom of speech, it was just hate speech. It’s a very interesting account. Miller knows the language, he knew the people. But I don’t think he understood the complexity and the relevance of Cosic’s group on the destruction of Yugoslavia. Cosic, for instance, didn’t become a nationalist just in 1986; he was a nationalist from long ago.

But what Miller exposes in this book is extremely relevant for everyone who wants to know something about those days. These nationalists started in the 1970s, especially through culture. That’s why culture is so very important for launching and normalizing the project of resurgent Serbian nationalism. Without that, it’s not possible to reach people to such an extent. Of course, state engagement is also relevant because states in countries like ours influence the cultural sphere.

I’ll come back to these issues, especially the implications for today of what happened in 1989-90 with Kosovo and Vojvodina. But first I want to ask you to assess your level of disappointment with what has happened in Serbia and former Yugoslavia since 1989.

First of all, over time I’ve learned a lot myself. I now have more information and more understanding. Now I would say that I’m not disappointed because this was to be expected. But if you asked me this question in 1989, I would probably say that I was extremely disappointed because I was still living as a Yugoslav citizen. I never identified with any of the ethnic groups and even today I consider myself simply a citizen. But now, after really going into the Serbian history of the 20th century, I would say that we couldn’t have expected better. Serbia is now where it started to head 30 years ago.

It took a long time for the international community to become aware of the Serbian trajectory, the Serbian project. And it took time for especially Western countries to take a clear position on what was going on in Yugoslavia. This hesitancy, this loss of focus, was reflected in the Dayton Agreement, which is totally dysfunctional for Bosnia. In the 1990s, nobody had a clear vision of where we were going as a whole. Milosevic as a leader was operating in this very murky situation. Like under water. He was destroying everything around him: federal institutions, even Serbian institutions. He introduced this anti-institutional approach to everything. He would bring people into the street and say that they had to change the constitution. Because the constitution couldn’t be changed without the consensus of the republics, Milosevic would get it changed from the street. One of the legal experts at the law school said, “This is the people’s constitution and we must listen to the voice of the people.” This was a legal argument!

This was how they destroyed not only the Yugoslav federation and its institutions but also Serbian institutions. We are now still living in this provisional state. We don’t have a modern state. When the West came in, it didn’t understand how destructive the legacy of Milosevic was. They behaved as if Serbia was just a normal country after the war. They treated all these people like normal people. It was only when Zoran Djindjic [the Serbian prime minister from 2001 to 2003] was assassinated that this legacy was revealed. And now in 2012, the West doesn’t know what to do. They’ve supported the current ruling coalition. But after two months they see that this may be disaster for all of us. This engineering of societies like ours has a limit, especially since our society hasn’t distanced itself from Milosevic’s policy.

There is a much harsher campaign against Tadic now than there ever was against Milosevic. The campaign is aimed not only at him and his party but at his orientation as well. The Democratic Party was the only strong pro-European party, despite all its weaknesses and flaws. There is a lot of ground for criticism. But now it’s overdone. In November, the Democratic Party will have its internal party elections. The ruling coalition is trying to destroy the party. If the Democratic Party splits, that will be an end to the party, because neither of them, neither Tadic nor Dragan Djilas [the mayor of Belgrade] would be able to take over the whole party without the consent of the other. If the Democratic Party splits, political life in Serbia faces a real danger for the next few years, until a new party consolidates along the same lines.

In 2003, after the assassination of Djindjic, the West had to topple the Democratic Party to bring in Vojislav Kostunica, who was the biggest disaster for Serbia because of his ideology, which was basically a Nazi ideology. They gave up on Kostunica only after he burned down the American embassy. What is really lacking in the Western approach is an understanding of this kind of society, which is now also visible in the Middle East. When you topple a leader, whether it’s a Qaddafi or a Mubarak or an Assad or whoever, you never know what’s behind him, especially if you don’t have strong voices from civil society. In the Arab Spring in Egypt, young people opposed the regime, but they had no strategy. And then who came in? The Muslim Brotherhood. It takes time to prepare these societies for real change. So, removal of the dictator and subsequent elections won’t necessarily bring in democracy.

We are now struggling with this in Serbia. President Tomislav Nikolic is not a democratic option. Also, the ruling coalition opened the doors for the Russians to come in. You can only see the Russian ambassador leaving Serbia with all these farewells and messages. Nikolic’s victory has really opened the door for true cooperation between Russia and Serbia. I think that the West and America underestimated the relevance of Russia in this region because they considered the Russians to be defeated after the fall of Berlin Wall. But the Russians were always present in the Balkans through the Serbian church, parts of the Army, and intellectual circles. Nowadays the whole region is very vulnerable energy-wise, and we all depend on Russian energy in one way or another. Serbia, through its major energy company NIS [Naftna Industrija Srbije], has the most inconvenient agreement with Russia on oil. The Russians also want to take over the railways. They want to take over the steel plant in Smederevo, which U.S. Steel gave up this year. They want to acquire other major Serbian assets as a guarantee of continued influence over any Serbian government, not only the current one.

The Russians might push for a postponement of a solution to the Kosovo issue, which is a priority now for the West and especially the United States. Nikolic said privately before he was elected that he would have a new policy on Kosovo. The new government would engage in high-level political communication. Nikolic was asking for consensus and even promised to include NGOS in the policy on Kosovo. But right now there is no single word about strategy in Kosovo. So Nikolic is buying time.

Martti Ahtisaari, who was the UN Special Envoy on Kosovo, recently said in an interview with the Serbian newspaper Danas that Serbia has lost the right to manage Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan almost amounts to partition, almost. But they don’t want to call it that. What Serbia really wants, Nikolic and others, is for the Serb enclaves to have Republika Srpska status there, like in Bosnia, which would be a source of long-term tension on both sides.

Would you distinguish in any important way Nikolic and the other nationalist forces in Serbia? I’m thinking, for instance, of Dveri Srpske.

No. Nikolic and his party are really just bringing in the mob. Even if Nikolic would be against this behavior, he can’t stop this primitivism from taking over all the institutions at the local and provincial level. These people want to be in power for the next 10 years. Okay, the Democratic Party is also corrupt. But Nikolic and the Socialists, the way they rule, are trying to restore the 1990s, ideologically. They rule arbitrarily, changing laws overnight. Tadic and the Democratic Party represent the middle class of Serbia, whatever that is. Tadic did try to change things. His government accepted partnership with NATO. They opened the way for army reform. Three countries were involved in that: the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway. And these reforms really went far beyond expectations. They professionalized the army. But what Aleksandar Vucic, the defense minister, is doing now….

Vucic immediately went to Moscow and made some kind of a military agreement. Each of these new Serbian leaders went to Russia immediately after the elections, and they continue to go frequently. Nikolic has met with Putin, and it was announced that Putin will come here in December. At least at this visible level, you can see this intensification of meetings. Whether it will be followed by concrete projects and money, we don’t know. But the Russians have promised to give $300 million for the Serbian budget. This is not a lot of money for the Russians. But it shows that they think Serbia is valuable in their maneuvering in this new world constellation. Serbia doesn’t need much money for the budget. Our leaders are not ambitious when it comes to the wellbeing of the country. They just need social peace. The Russians don’t think they can get something here in Serbia. But Serbia is a good example of a small country that they can use whenever they need it.

Hilary Clinton will be visiting Serbia very soon. Do you think the United States can play any role in Serbia?

The United States has had an important role in the region because it was perceived by all countries as a strong power with its interventions and all that. Serbia thinks that Americans prevented their national project, which the United States did through intervention, both in Bosnia and Kosovo. This nationalistic elite is very much against America. They think that Americans took the side of Muslims against Serbs. Young people, of course, go to America and the West; they don’t go to Russia. Young people are highly frustrated by the image of Serbia. They identify with Novak Djokovic, with folk singers. There’s nothing much to identity with otherwise. Young people have a totally schizophrenic attitude. The first three sentences out of their mouths will be okay, and the next three will be totally wrong.

People here are hospitable, easygoing. But when you touch on this national issue, their identity, it is such a confusion: are Karadzic and Mladic, for instance, heroes or war criminals?

You don’t see an important generational difference on the nationalist issue?

No, unfortunately. Young people are totally ignorant and frustrated. Nobody is working with them, except for a few NGOs. It’s too little. We run some education programs through which we can understand their problems. We take them to hotels outside Belgrade and put them through a ten-day course. They change easily. When you provide them with a referential system and you explain things, they immediately act like a fish in the water. Then they start to understand.

The messages they get – from the educational system, from their families, from the media, from the political leaders — they’re all misguiding. The narrative about the wars in the 1990s is that we all committed crimes, that the secessionist republics are responsible, that the West took the side of these republics, that it was all a conspiracy of the West to destroy the Serbs — at this level of consciousness it’s all confusion.

Even the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) judgments have no impact on attitudes, particularly of the Serbian elites. The elites say that all judgments are anti-Serb. You can read about the judgments against Muslims, Croats, and Albanians in the Serbian media, for example the Ramush Haradinaj case [the former Kosovo Liberation Army leader was acquitted in 2008 and awaits a verdict in a retrial]. Or take the issue of the trafficking of organs. On the very day that Kosovo’s supervised independence ended, there was a big press conference with an Albanian witness who talked about how he was taught to take out the heart of a Serbian victim — as if you can just come in and cut out any organ. And people buy this story. Because there has been very limited reporting on what’s going on in Kosovo.

So you don’t believe the allegations that Carla del Ponte made about the KLA being involved in organ trafficking?

I don’t trust her. She destroyed all the materials she had on that case. Otherwise she would have undertaken an investigation when she was prosecutor. Look, there are 1,700 missing people in Kosovo, and only 500 of them are Serbs. Between 10 and 11,000 Albanians were killed during the war, but only a few hundred Serbs. Here in Serbia, nobody talks about the 1,200 missing Albanians. They don’t exist.

On this organ trafficking case, there is an EU rapporteur and a team, and they are maintaining a very low profile, without media. This is a good approach, because otherwise it would be politicized. Obviously something happened on this issue. We heard similar rumors from Bosnia, but nobody undertook an investigation. I’m not saying that it didn’t happen. But it’s not only an Albanian-Serb problem. It’s a world problem. Who knows who was involved in the case? What other doctors were involved? Here you only hear “trafficking in organs by Albanians.” They try to criminalize Kosovo in this way. And it had an impact on Western perception for a while. The recognition process was slowed down.

Jeremic was traveling around the non-aligned world, stirring up emotions within the international community against Kosovo. But in the end Serbia is really losing time. We are the losers. That’s the problem. Serbia is really isolated, self-isolated. We lost so many opportunities for investment. With this new government, our credit rating is down. Who knows how we are going to get out of it. And now they have introduced a new level of tensions with Vojvodina.

They are also fighting against corruption. But they have no instruments or people for this campaign. Vucic, who is deputy prime minister but also minster of defense, is now engaged only in corruption. Every day he comes up with a new name, there is a media campaign, and then there is nothing after that. This process is corrupt. The Progressive Party and the Socialist Party should be part of the investigation. The biggest corruption happened during the Milosevic years. You don’t solve the problem by just throwing out the word “corruption.” You have to do something concrete. People buy it because they are all angry and depressed. They want their social problems solved. So, the government retreats into populist measures. Who knows what they will do in the next few months if they don’t have enough money to pay pensions and salaries.

One of the important things you’ve pushed for is greater people-to-people contact between people here and in Kosovo, between NGOS here and there. You already said that there isn’t much going on with young people here. Where do you see the most hope in terms of this people-to-people connection?

Our organization, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, has been present in Kosovo for almost 20 years. We started with monitoring and reporting in the 1990s until 1998-99. We also organized dialogue between elites, intellectuals, and NGOs in Kosovo and Serbia. In 1997, we had a big conference in Ulcinj, in Montenegro. In 1998, we had a big conference here in Belgrade at the Hyatt where everyone relevant to political life in Kosovo was present, everyone except Ibrahim Rugova. It was in vain. The process still led to military intervention. Still, it was important to have people from both sides who were able to meet within the country and not just abroad.

After the military intervention, we were also the first down there along with some other groups. We were involved in very intensive cooperation with civil society in Kosovo. People would come here. There were no obstructions to travel. Then, in 2008, after Kosovo declared independence, Albanians were obstructed from crossing the Serbian border. Still, we continued to go, along with Youth Initiative for Human Rights and some other organizations. We focused on the Serb community in Kosovo. We lobbied for the integration of Kosovo institutions. They did take part in local and republic level. But Serbia continued to keep the northern part of Kosovo hostage. There was also talk of swapping the territory as a possible solution: the south of Serbia for the north of Kosovo. But I think that Serbia never had this in mind because this area is strategically important as a corridor to Macedonia.

In the north of Kosovo, the Serbian community has lived under the umbrella of criminal groups that have profited from smuggling. In fact, there are interest groups on both sides that have profited from keeping this northern part of Kosovo in a kind of limbo. Last year, Serbia finally made an effort to partition Kosovo because they thought at the time that it would work in their favor. Kosovo Serbs began to put up barricades. The Serbian authorities, like current Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic, started to speak officially about partition.

Then German Chancellor Angela Merkel came here, and she was very brutal, and rightly so. She said: “No partition and no candidacy. If you don’t start the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, you won’t get candidacy.” Candidacy for the European Union was one of the major assets that the Democratic Party could use to win the subsequent elections, so they started a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade under EU auspices. And they came to an agreement about controlling borders, the symbols on the custom seal, and so on. Serbia obtained candidacy in March and that was the main asset with which Tadic hoped to win the elections. But now implementation depends on the current government.

Serbia confronts this tough position of the West that partition is not possible. So the Serbian authorities are trying to come up with a solution. It depends on how much they will be forced to resolve the Kosovo issue: what Russia will offer and whether they will be able to cope in the current economic situation without Western help. There are a lot of factors that will influence the resolution of the Kosovo issue at this point. But the West is really hoping that Nikolic will deliver.

And you think that’s naive?

It depends on a lot of factors. The Serbian government will probably ask for the north of Kosovo to be a “region.” Integration, they will say, will take a long time. This will give them a chance to see what happens worldwide and if these enclaves can achieve a Republika Srpska status in the long term.

There is also this perception here that the EU will fall apart. In this case, why should we become a member in something that is about to fall apart? But nobody is really following what is going on in the EU. They don’t understand that, after 40-50 years, it comes to a point when an institution has to change, to accommodate to a new reality. The Serbian project of Milosevic and others, on the other hand, was against the spirit of time. When they started in the 1980s, though they had this idea in mind much earlier, they thought that the international environment was playing into their hands. And at the moment it looked like that. But as the world has settled down, we turn out to be the real losers. It’s not only because of the wars, but because we lost an opportunity to do something in this country. Because we didn’t accept the new realities, we have had very tense relations with all our neighbors. It’s only now, because the criteria of regional cooperation are very important for the EU, that you see some changes at the political level.

It’s unclear what will happen at this elite level. But your initiatives at a grassroots level, what do you hope to achieve?

In Kosovo, we spent seven months talking with Serbs in all these enclaves, including some known figures, and we heard a great deal. We later produced a report. In this report, you can see that these Kosovo Serbs had already accepted Albanians. There was local cooperation going on behind the scenes. But nobody has wanted to report on it.

At the level of ordinary people, it will go much easier. But the elites are preventing that. In order to bring Albanians and Serbs together — or Serbs and Croats, or Serbs and Bosniaks — you need a responsible and mature elite to do something within Serbia. They need to say, “Okay, we are defeated. But from defeat we can draw some energy and do something else.” Our elite is not doing this. Without doing this, you cannot go to the region and say, “Let’s reconcile. Let’s normalize as if nothing has happened.” It’s not possible. It can go to a certain extent. But all these differences brew beneath the surface, and the tensions rise up again during difficult situations.

How strong is the movement in Vojvodina pushing for greater autonomy and what do you envision will be the outcome of this struggle?

First of all, Vojvodina is not an ethnic issue. It’s really about who controls the money and who manages the economy, which has been destroyed over the years. Vojvodina is an agricultural region. And agriculture here is totally devastated. The land here is divided into small parcels. It’s not based on a modern concept like in the United States where you have two percent of the population working in agriculture and feeding the whole world. Here you have enormously rich and fertile land, but the rural population is very old. Even where the farmers aren’t old, a family can’t run agriculture without modern equipment. No one is doing anything along these lines, so this agricultural potential is totally lost.

Vojvodina has a different political culture altogether. It can more easily meet EU standards and more easily access EU funds. In fact, Vojvodina is considered to be the only region in Serbia capable of accessing these EU funds, which will open up as soon as they start negotiations. Many of the countries in Eastern Europe were not able to use these funds. They didn’t know how. So, much of it was lost or unused because of this inability to use and spend these funds.

Generally, Serbia is totally devastated professionally. Many young people are still leaving the country. Many professionals have already left the country. We don’t have industry. People are buying up factories and closing them down. They’re just waiting for the moment to sell them to foreigners. At this moment, most people are just sitting idle. But there are a few islands that demonstrate that something can be done, and Vojvodina is one of these.

But in Vojvodina at this moment, more and more people are furious with Belgrade. And it’s growing. There were lots of reactions from Vojvodina after the Serbian Constitutional Court decided that the statute of Vojvodina, which was passed during the democratic Tadic rule, is now anti-constitutional because it asserts too much autonomy for the province. Behind all this is Kostunica. His party his small, but there are many intellectuals, law professors, and so on that are members. They are the ideological radicals of the ruling coalition. They make all these accusations, and then Nikolic says that Serbia will ban all parties that are “anti-constitutional,” that support more autonomy for Vojvodina. So, the Vojvodina issue is really a constitutional problem. The Serbian authorities are trying first of all to change the constitution over the long term and meanwhile implement their interpretation of the existing constitution.

There is another possibility. If Vojvodina’s push for a more decentralized state fails, then the Hungarians may ask for the kind of territorial autonomy that was in place for two decades until the late 1980s. This new government in Hungary is also very chauvinistic, and it is working on behalf of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. A Hungarian deputy minister recently said that he supported the idea that the north of Kosovo should become a region. Behind this is really Hungarian support for a similar kind of solution for Vojvodina as well as for Hungarian regions in Romania and Slovakia.

Serbia faces three such requests: from Bosniaks in Sandzak, from Kosovars in south Serbia, and from Hungarians in Vojvodina. The problem is that Serbia doesn’t understand that if you ask for maximum status for ethnic Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, then it’s just a matter of time before someone else will demand the same thing from the Serbian government. The international community thought that these demands came about because we were at war. They didn’t anticipate, for instance, that the Hungarian government would become so chauvinistic. Also, the economic problems that European countries are facing might trigger this kind of scenario. That’s why Merkel said last year, “no partition.” Because then maybe Macedonia would be next in line in terms of partition. You never know.

This is really about the EU’s decision about its principles. Either the EU reinforces the principles, the civic values, on which Europe was based for the last 50 years. Or Europe develops more along ethnic lines, and there is no end to it.

You are saying that unless Vojvodina has the kind of autonomy that it is asking for – in terms of state structures, not ethnic issues — unless it achieves this kind of autonomy to access EU funds and, for example, improve its agriculture, then the possibility of a more radical scenario, supported by a chauvinistic Hungarian government, becomes a greater possibility. The more the current Serbian government pushes against autonomy, the more likely the situation will radicalize.


We talked a little about nationalism, the strength of nationalism, not only at a political level, but also at a cultural level. I’m going to ask the flip side of that: about the strength of liberalism, of liberal ideology. This ideology is somewhat embodied by the Democratic Party but not always, as you pointed out. There were a lot of limitations even with Djindjic. But do you see a kind of authentic, tolerant liberalism emerging here in Serbia that gives you hope? We know that there have been liberal traditions here before, so it’s not about creating something completely new.

Yes, the liberal option always existed, though it was a tiny one. But you never know when such a tiny option can prevail in a given situation.

Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Serbia proper are all different cultural and political entities. Serbia never accepted a federation within itself. It was trying to centralize the country along the lines of Serbia proper, not according to the more European Vojvodina. And Kosovo is even more conservative. Serbian leaders simply didn’t take into account all these differences within Serbia. They missed the opportunity to adapt to the complexities of each of these societies. They oversimplified the Serbian nation. Then you had all these Serbs that came here as refugees, but they too are all culturally different, though they have the same religion.

Communism, or socialism, in former Yugoslavia was a modernizing faith for Serbian society, a way to establish universal values in the country. It had its limitations in terms of political liberties. But three important legacies of this period were education, health care, and tolerance toward minorities. The nationalist project has created such hysteria against this legacy of modernism that it’s necessary to undertake a similar project to suppress the nationalists. What we have now is really the EU, which is helping to build up institutions along certain values, criteria, and standards. But we still don’t have true reform of education. And our media still acts in favor of the status quo. It is still influenced by groups that are not interested in change in Serbia, groups that don’t favor either the free market or a change of political elites.

Finally, we don’t have a flourishing civil society. We had a dynamic civil society only because the West was very interested in bringing down Milosevic. We had a “united bloc” against Milosevic thanks to the United States and U.S. donors. After this period, there were fewer donors. They moved elsewhere. But the more liberal groups in this country remained under pressure, and the Serbian government conducted campaigns to demonize these groups as traitors, as disloyal, as exponents of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. This really shaped the perception of us in society. For instance, when they invite me to a talk show, I am always presented as someone who was in favor of U.S. and NATO military intervention. Or they said that we wanted to return Serbian refugees to Tudjman’s Croatia.

You also have minorities who might be conservative but are still pro-European because there is no other way for them. They are instinctively oriented toward Europe because this is their safe haven. They are always looking toward integration because they are totally outside the political, economic, and cultural community here. The former government, under Tadic, had all kinds of action plans and strategies for dealing with Roma and other vulnerable groups. But this state doesn’t have the money to implement these programs. Implementation will come from either EU funds or from individual member states.

But you have to create an atmosphere for that. Who can help? Civil society. EU delegations from these countries cooperate with the government, which is normal. But civil society can provide independent pressure on the government. We are the ones interested in seeing the implementation of all these action plans.

Our society is very racist against Roma and Albanians, very hostile toward Croats and Bosniaks. You can’t change this with two or three statements. You have to work on this on a daily basis. It’s a long process. It won’t happen in two or even 10 years. There was, after the Second World War, a Marshall Plan for the recovery of the German economy. But it took more than 20 years to discuss within German society what happened during the war. In Serbia, which is a smaller society, it goes even slower.

We are a defeated country, but nobody says that in their diplomatic or economic dealings with Serbia. This may be right. But at another level, you cannot expect regional reconciliation without Serbia taking responsibility for starting the war. Who were the most indicted at the ICTY? Serbs. Why? Because proportionately they committed most of the crimes. That says something. Serbs usually complain to foreigners that most of the indicated were Serbs. But they never acknowledge that most of the war criminals were in fact Serbs.

The Kosovo judgment against the top Serbian officials in the army, the police, and the political institutions is 1,500 pages long. Everything is described there: what happened in 1989-90, not to mention the 1980s and 1990s, how many people were killed down there. For two days, the Serbian media covered it – but only as an anti-Serbian judgment. I’m sorry, but in order to put the region in order, Serbia has the most homework to do. Other countries also have homework to do, but they won’t do it until they see that Serbia has started the process. This doesn’t mean putting Serbia in a corner. But we should know, especially the young generation, why it happened. People have to understand what was behind all this. Very often, you hear people say, “What has befallen us? Who did this to us?” Or they say, “Let’s forget about it.” Or they say, “Yugoslavia was a perfect state.” They say these things because they want to forget. And they are not offered anything better than Yugoslavia.

We had an educational program this summer with children from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. I was a lecturer on Yugoslavia. The children knew nothing. They’d heard of Yugoslavia, of course, but they didn’t even know who the leaders were at that time or what Yugoslavia was internationally. My lecture was for 3 hours. But they kept me two more hours asking me questions. Because they were hungry to know about all this. So there is chance to work with these people. But it has to be comprehensive and very well conceived in order to have impact on their attitudes and their understanding of their former country.

You cannot delete Yugoslavia. You cannot delete socialism. It was our reality. Even if you’re against these things, it doesn’t mean that they aren’t relevant to your history. I think that anti-communism helped these nationalists destroy everything that referred to Yugoslavia. It happened in many socialist countries. Many new elites derived their legitimacy from this nationalism of the Second World War ideologues of the extreme right, like Draza Mihailovic and Milan Nedic here in Serbia, or in Hungary or the Baltic countries.

There was a resolution in the European Parliament initiated by the Baltic countries, the 2009 resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism, that equated Nazism and communism. This is an Eastern European thing, and it’s very much anti-Russian. In response, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev came to the parliament here in Belgrade and delivered a speech that sent a message that Nazism and communism were not equal, first of all because the communists helped liberate Europe from fascism. Similarly, there is a debate in the EU about May 9, whether this is a liberation day or an occupation day. In this way, they’re changing the narrative of the Second World War. We’re not really part of this debate here in Serbia, but still people somehow make use of the discussion.

For example, you start to talk about Serbia and war crimes here, and then a professor from law school responds that Americans committed genocide against Indians. You cannot finish a conversation about Serbia because they always introduce something from two centuries ago!

Why are modern European values based on anti-fascism? It’s much deeper than just fighting against Nazism. It’s about fighting against discrimination. All these conventions and human rights networks were based on this anti-fascist struggle. People just don’t know what anti-fascism means as a value.

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