IPS Blog

The Pedigree of the “Horsewich”

HorsewichConn Hallinan began a recent Focal Points post titled The Sunset of the “Celtic Tiger” Led to the Dawn of the “Horsewich”:

“As the Great Horsemeat Crisis continues to spread—“gallops” is the verb favored by the European press—across the continent, and countries pile on to blame Romania (France, Holland, Cyprus, etc.), what is becoming increasingly clear is that old-fashioned corporate greed, aided and abetted by politicians eager to gut “costly” regulations and industrial inspection regimes, is behind the scandal.”

Another excerpt:

“’It is a shame that testing by the FSA has been reduced,’ Dr. Chris Smart told the Guardian. ‘I am sure there will be other crises that come along in the next few years.’ And given that UK food prices have risen nearly 26 percent that will surely be the case. Inspectors have already uncovered adulterated olive oil and paprika made from roof tiles. … At the heart of this are the continent-wide austerity programs that have driven up the ranks of the poor, requiring low-income families to rely on cheap meat or go without.”

To illustrate the crisis — and Conn’s post — Foreign Policy in Focus and Focal Points contributor Leslie Garvey has created the accompanying infographic.

The Two Europes

Cross-posted from JohnFeffer.com. John is currently traveling in Eastern Europe and observing its transformations since 1989.

The subtitle of Benjamin Disraeli’s novel Sybil, about Britain of the mid-19th century, refers to the “two nations” of rich and the poor. The gap between these two halves of society was a central preoccupation of social reformers during the Industrial Revolution. Nor has this divide between rich and poor in Europe gone away, despite the efforts of the welfare state. Indeed, in recent years, the divide has only grown wider.

I recently traveled by train from London to Berlin and was struck by a different divide that has opened up in Europe. These “two nations” are the mobile and the stationary. And this divide, like the one that so engaged Disraeli, has had an equally profound impact on the politics of the moment.

Europe has fully entered the era of the mobile. You can commute by train from London to Brussels in two hours, faster than the trip by Amtrak from New York to Washington, DC. For all British Prime Minister David Cameron’s talk of the UK choosing the a la carte option for EU membership, his country is now tethered firmly by its Chunnel umbilicus. Once on the continent, the train system puts Amtrak to shame at every level: speed, reliability, comfort, food (well, the currywurst I ate on the train to Berlin was approximately equal to an Amtrak hotdog). For those in a greater hurry, cheap airline tickets bring people rapidly from Dublin to Athens and Lisbon to Gdansk.

The tribe of the mobile is not restricted to the leisure class. The opening of the borders within the European Union facilitated an extraordinary labor migration as Poles moved westward, the British moved south, Spaniards moved north, and the adventurous sought jobs eastward in Prague and Bucharest and Sofia. The definition of guest workers (gastarbeiter), as well as their overall numbers, has expanded enormously, and bureaucrats now prefer the term “mobile workers.” Nor is it just the young who are on the move. “Retirement migration” has created the European version of snowbirds. And, of course, there are the involuntary migrants, escaping the war in former Yugoslavia or trafficked against their will to brothels.

This mobility within Europe, on top of the waves of immigrants and asylum-seekers coming from outside the continent, has destroyed any vestige of the ethnically homogenous European state. The end of empire, and the flow of people from former colonies to the imperial metropoles, had already made England and the Netherlands and France into multiethnic environments. But now even Scandinavia and Ireland are being remade by the new otherlanders. Europe has now become not just a continent of regions but a continent of neighborhoods: the French quarter of South Kensington in London, the Turkish environment of Kreuzberg in Berlin, the Vietnamese community in Warsaw’s Praga section.

This is the Europe of shifting cosmopolitan identities: the Manhattanization of the continent. Philip Roth’s brilliant novel The Counterlife imagines a movement called Diasporism devoted to the return of Jews not to Israel but to the Europe of Polish shtetls and tony German neighborhoods. This obviously hasn’t happened. Instead, regardless of its religion, this half of Europe has embraced Diasporism, and the era of fixed national identities is over.

Or perhaps not. There is another Europe. After all, not everyone is on the move. The other half of Europe has stayed put. It has remained in the same place, the same village, even the same house for generations. It speaks of centuries of family involvement in municipal affairs or tending the same vineyards or defending the country against invaders. This part of Europe has no intention of pulling up roots and moving to some strange land. The younger generation might peel off and join mobile Europe. But still, someone continues to tend the family hearth.

According to a 2005 study, only 22 percent of Europeans moved outside their region or country – compared to 32 percent of Americans who moved outside the state where they were born. That’s a very big majority of people who stay close to home.

The great debates raging in Europe today are a function of this divide between the mobile and the stationary. Do you support a headscarf ban, an end to the new construction of minarets, stricter controls on immigration, and a go-slow approach to European expansion? Or do you celebrate multicultural education, Gay Pride festivals, more generous benefits for foreign workers, and the greater diversity of restaurants in your neighborhood?

You could simply attribute this divide to liberals versus conservatives. But what makes these debates so heated is not so much the ideological division but the deep cultural division. Half of Europe clings to what it believes are native traditions tied to land, language, and traditional lifestyle. The other half has embraced a completely different Europe that is not defined by national identity or, at least, one national identity. There is hybrid Europe, and then there is the Europe that imagines itself to be a collection of indivisible nation-state billiard balls that can kiss or collide but not merge.

Let me be clear. Some of the people who are in flux are as traditional and conservative as you can get. And some of the people who are staying in one place are paragons of tolerance and open-mindedness. But the members of the first group, however conservative their mores might be, are creating a fundamentally new European reality that transcends their own personal politics.

We might celebrate the Europe of terroir, of culture based in a specific locale. But, increasingly, the people who will be perpetuating this terroir will themselves come from different lands – like Korean-Americans who become involved in Civil War reenactments or Italian-Americans who run gumbo restaurants in New Orleans. This comparison is not chosen at random. Europe is becoming ever more American in its demography. Once the exporter of immigrants, Europe must now refashion itself as an immigrant society.

The European Community was an effort to erase the traumas of the first and second World Wars. The new Europe Union, if it is to survive its current economic challenges, will similarly attempt to erase the traumas of the Cold War and the conflicts that immediately sprang up in its wake. But the EU must also grapple with a more fundamental tension between a traditional past and a multicultural future.

This tension between the mobile and the stationary can be creative and not just contentious. The two Europes could, for instance, consummate an opposites-attract marriage. But before we send out that particular marriage announcement, we’ll have to see the political defeat of the Geert Wilders and Marie Le Pens and Victor Orbans of Europe and the victory of politicians and artists who are more sensitive to the paradoxes of modern European life.

Interview with Janet Redman, IPS, on the Green Climate Fund

Janet Redman, Green Climate Fund Civil Society Observer

A meeting is being held this week in Berlin, Germany, to discuss an important fund that could provide money to poor countries to help them adapt to a warmer world, build clean energy infrastructure, and avoid further climate crisis. Janet Redman, co-director of the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network at IPS, is a civil society observer at the meeting and an expert on the Green Climate Fund. Lacy MacAuley, IPS media manager, interviewed Redman before she departed for Berlin:

Institute for Policy Studies: Government finance, development and environment ministry officials from around the world will be meeting this week in Berlin to talk about the Green Climate Fund. What is the Green Climate Fund and why is it important?

Janet Redman: The Green Climate Fund is a new financing body that was created by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to be a key part of the global fight to stop climate disruption and deal with the unequal impacts of global warming. Right now there are no international institutions that specifically address climate change on the scale necessary to match the magnitude of the problem. Ultimately, we need to transform the global economy in order to solve the climate crisis. That’s what we’re hoping this fund will help do.

A big part of that transformation needs to be building resilience to climate change in the countries that are most impacted, but least financially able and institutionally prepared to cope with those impacts. These are the same countries that are the least responsible for causing the climate crisis. These are the countries of the global South.

The other part of the transformation is about shifting the way we think about ‘development’ so that we move away from a paradigm that says unlimited growth based on extracting and burning dirty fuels is the same as well being. Countries in the global South have the right to develop. We practiced that right in the North . We expect the lights to come on when we flip a switch. People living in poorer countries also deserve to have the lights come on when they flip a switch. But if those countries follow the same energy path that we used to get here – burning dirty coal and oil, razing forests – we’re not going to be able to keep greenhouse gas emissions at safe levels, levels that prevent catastrophic global warming.

IPS: So the Green Climate Fund will help poor countries adapt to climate change, and help them avoid dirty energy?

JR: That’s the idea. The Fund is so important because there’s a need for lots of money, lots of financing – we’re talking about estimates of up to $1.2 trillion per year for adaptation and greenhouse gas mitigation in developing countries – to actually implement the good ideas about new transportation systems, distributed energy, sustainable agriculture, and much, much more that people are drafting. Many developing countries have already articulated in their own plans and their own strategies to deal with climate. But a huge barrier is that there’s just not a lot of funding or institutional infrastructure to move these ideas into action right now.

Countries in the north need to commit to raising the money in innovative and fair ways like taxing financial transactions, taxing carbon, and taking handouts away from fossil fuel companies. Then the Green Climate Fund can do the job it was created for – channeling money from developed to developing nations to deal with the impacts of climate change, to move to low-carbon, sustainable development pathways, and to build climate resilience into the way that they are doing development.

IPS: What is on the agenda at this week’s meeting in Berlin?

JR: Civil society is pretty much in agreement that this fund needs to put the needs of climate impacted and vulnerable people at the core of it’s design, so we’re working to make sure that the Green Climate Fund is centered as much as possible on national level climate plans and that those plans are created in a way that’s truly participatory. A country’s climate plans and strategies should include the government and input from people who are often politically marginalized. Then we need to work out how civil society participates in all the different structures at the national level, and that there’s meaningful public participation at the Fund’s international decision-making board. That’s why more than 70 organizations sent a letter to the GCF’s board members urging them to keep the board meetings open, transparent, and accountable. The Green Climate Fund’s design needs to be an open process, and not a closed-door process.

One of the most important parts of this meeting is that board members will be talking about what they call the “business model” of the Green Climate Fund. We hope they’ll come to agreement about the explicit and specific goals of the Fund will be, and from there we expect them to dig into the controversial issue of whether the Fund will fundamentally be about moving public sector money or private sector money.

IPS: Why should we be watching whether the fund moves public/taxpayer money or private/corporate money?

JR: Focusing on leveraging private sector investment is not the best way to help countries avoid climate crisis. One of our major concern is that we’ve seen financial support from existing private sector institutions like the International Finance Corporation bypass least developed countries, the smallest economies, the poorest countries, or even poor and marginalized people within middle-income countries or larger economies. And adaptation isn’t likely to garner much private sector support because helping poor communities relocate, deal with the impacts of flooding, reduce risks from extreme weather-related disasters is not particularly profitable – nor should it be.

Of course the private sector has role to play in transforming the global economy, but the Green Climate Fund should support local private sector actors, local investors who are interested in developing a sustainable national economy, not attracting large pools of private money from overseas that needs to be repaid to foreign investors.

IPS: How is the so-called “business model” related to this private sector scheme?

JR: The language around developing a ‘business model’ for the fund has been part of the larger slippery slope that risks orienting the fund toward meeting the needs of private sector finance. As I said, the private sector should be one piece of the puzzle, not the go to funding solution. The Fund board needs to work with civil society to understand when it’s appropriate to engage the private sector, and when depending on private investment undermines democratic development and weakens public institutions that are needed to deal with climate change. If this fund is about mobilizing the greatest volume of private investment possible instead of meeting the adaptation and clean energy needs of people in developing countries, then we’re risking not actually addressing the climate crisis. What we’re doing then is making attractive rates of return for private financiers, but that’s not the point of the Green Climate Fund.

The opening paragraphs of the Green Climate Fund document lay out how the fund is supposed to be actively promoting a “paradigm shift.” We’re very concerned that the paradigm shift may be just building more global financial infrastructure, instead of a shift away from exploitation, extraction, and overconsumption. It’s about reducing greenhouse gas emissions globally, but we also need to understand that countries need to develop in ways that leave our planet safe for future generations.

IPS: It seems like the private sector, corporations, and financiers have a lot of voice in these meetings. How are civil society, advocates, and concerned citizens being heard?

JR: Civil society has been given very little space to participate in the development of ideas that are being discussed at this meeting. For example, all of global civil society is being represented by two people – one from the North and one from the South. This means that the specific perspectives of groups that are impacted by climate change and proposed solutions like Indigenous peoples, workers, youth, women won’t be heard. And the two representatives in the room in Berlin will have only limited interventions – three minutes on each agenda item, and then only at the behest of the board chairs.

Other observers will have to sit in an adjacent room watching the meeting over a feed, even though there are rooms in the building big enough to accommodate most observers. And to add insult to injury, the board has so far refused to webcast the meeting, even though it is livestreaming it into the observer holding room.

What that says to us is that the board has not interest in transparency. It seems they don’t want people looking at their process, they want to have a closed conversation. That’s unacceptable. This is a 21st century fund that’s moving backwards from existing standards even in the World Bank’s climate funds – and it’s a fund that we all have a stake in.

IPS: Is there any hope that the Green Climate Fund can be effective, given the challenges and frustrations that you’ve described?

JR: I still have some hope. I think there is a possibility that it could be an institution that could help support countries, empower communities and avoid climate change.

It’s exciting that there’s an institution focused on a “paradigm shift,” since a paradigm shift is really what we need. One thing is clear: This fund should not support fossil-fuel-based technologies or nuclear energy. This fund should not fund megaprojects that displace people and destroy the land. We need a fund that actually does good, not harm.

With Bus Segregation Israeli Apartheid Becomes More Blatant

Israel’s continued disregard for Palestinians is yet again highlighted in its latest segregation of the region’s bus system—modern day apartheid at its finest. Especially problematic is the fact that the bus system is a public service and under law should employ nondiscriminatory practices. The Palestinian Deputy Labor Minister and the Workers’ Union have denounced the “racist measures.”

The Israeli transportation authorities have said that segregation of the bus lines was put into effect to improve overall service for Palestinians by making the transport more effective. They also claim costs will fall—Palestinians will no longer be required to pay high prices for private, unregulated taxis to bring them to and from checkpoints.

Media reports indicate, however, that Jewish settlers lodged complaints with the government concerning safety on the buses with Palestinians aboard. Settlers also claimed buses were crowded and that high tensions between Palestinians and settlers pose security risks. This reasoning is likely the real reasoning for this troublesome policy.

The plan has drawn the opposition of the Israeli Knesset’s more progressive members. Zahava Gal-On, leader of the leftist Meretz leftist political party, called for the immediate cancellation of the segregated bus lines. “Separate bus lines for Palestinians prove that occupation and democracy cannot coexist,” he said. The Israeli human rights group B’Tselem also condemned the move, calling it “revolting.”

A few citizens took drastic measures to protest the segregation policy by setting aflame two of the buses just one day after its implementation. Discontent amongst Palestinians is apparent—how much further will Israel go to isolate this continually marginalized population?

The monetary savings of having segregated bus lines may be helpful to Palestinians but overall this policy does nothing to improve or even sustain the delicate political balance between these two populations. Israel continues to implement segregationist policies, pushing political boundaries to the breaking point while at the same time having no regard for the resulting repercussions.

Renee Lott is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.

Emphasis Added: The Foreign Policy Week in Pieces (3/8/13)

Emphasis, as always, added.

The UN Temperance League

“We make the modest proposal that the negotiating rooms should in future be an inebriation-free zone,” Joseph Torsella, deputy U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for management and reform, told the General Assembly’s budget committee.

“While my government is truly grateful for the strategic opportunities presented by some recent past practices, let’s save the champagne for toasting the successful end of the session, and do some credit to the Fifth Committee’s reputation in the process,” he said.

An annual vote of the budget committee … tends to come at Christmas time in late December. The debates often become heated marathon sessions that run into the early hours of the morning.

Diplomats who participate [in] sessions have told Reuters that it is not unusual to see delegates showing visible signs of having imbibed heavily.

U.S. urges ban on drunk diplomats at UN budget debates, Reuters

Reserve First Use of Nukes for Hackers Along With Nuclear and Biochemical Weapon Attacks!

The United States should be prepared to use every military option, including nuclear retaliation, in response to a huge computer attack, an independent Department of Defense task force said.

… “It would have to be extreme,” Paul Kaminski, chair of the Science Board and a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, said about the kind of attack that might trigger a nuclear response. “It would have to be the kind of attack that we would judge would be threatening our survival.”

Well, as long as it’s extreme.

Report: US Should Keep Nuke Option for Cyberattack, Andrew Conte, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review

Would Sanctions Drive Iran from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Enmity with Iran is deeply institutionalized in the US political system. This explains many lost opportunities to improve relations, as well as the swiftness with which Obama’s initial diplomatic failure was translated into a determination to sanction the Iranian economy into ruins. Given Obama’s unprecedented success on the sanctions front, it might just be too tempting to keep Iran on its knees until it capitulates or its regime changes. [But] Absent a way out of the current predicament, Iran has little to lose in withdrawing from the Treaty of Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

With Iran posed to be a regional player, US should find ways to repair relations, Tytti Erästö, Global Post

Be There or Be Square: the Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit

At this conference, like the previous ones, the most tedious aspect is the fundamentalist flavor of much of the discourse – the intense intellectual and psychological attachment and rehearsal of a nebulous and highly abstract construct. … Nuclear Deterrence. … It reminded me of Santa Claus, or the Tooth Fairy, or their evil twins. … The nuclear tooth fairy leaves billions of dollars under the pillow each and every year.

… This year, like other years, aging cold warriors are brought forth to lead the hosannas, renew the faith, recall the glory days when the enterprise was running on all eight cylinders (when it was as large and “important” as the U.S. automobile industry itself) and contribute their ideas as to how to keep faith alive in an age of doubt.

Reflections on the Deterrence Summit, Greg Mello, the Los Alamos Study Group

Ability of Nuclear Deterrence to Defuse Crises Exaggerated

Nuclear StatecraftWe may owe thanks for the absence of war (other than proxy) during the Long Peace — aka the Cold War — between the United States and the Soviet Union less to nuclear deterrence, as is commonly assumed, than to the “underlying politics.” That’s a thesis beginning to gain credibility which Francis J. Gavin presents as well as anyone (though I’ve just begun the book) in Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Cornell University Press, 2012).

Theories about nuclear weapons, he writes (my additions bracketed):

… were based on a certain view of the world: that the international system was no longer solely driven by geopolitical competition between the great states. While these drives still mattered, international relations were now shaped by the existence of and interaction between rival nuclear forces. The weapons themselves — their lethality, their numbers, their deployments — drove the politics, not the other way around. The interaction could produce outcomes — arms races, dangerous crises, and even inadvertent war — separate from the political sources of the rivalry. These theories implied that the most effective policy might not be focusing on the underlying political dispute between rivals but to control their [nuclear] weapons and their interactions. [In part, it] meant that mutual efforts had to be made to limit dangers and to negotiate, not about the core geopolitical issues driving the dispute, but control of the weapons themselves.

“This is an extraordinary way of viewing international relations,” Gavin continues. But, he asks, “does it accurately reflect the way the world works?” He then attempts to answer his own question. (Emphasis added.)

It is interesting to reflect on how rarely the ups and downs of the superpower geopolitical competition mirrored the movements of the arms race. The Soviets pushed the United States aggressively on the issue of West Germany’s military status by threatening West Berlin’s viability at a time when the USSR was not only weak but potentially open to a US first strike in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Soviets left West Berlin alone after 1962, even as the US nuclear superiority that arguably helped protect the city disappeared. Why? Because the core geopolitical questions surrounding West Germany’s military and political status were resolved, largely to the Soviet Union’s satisfaction. In fact, it is very hard to find any evidence that … the Soviets ever considered launching a “bolt from the blue” against the United States.

Ward Wilson also approached the failure of deterrence in the Berlin crisis of 1948. In his book, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), about which we recently posted, he writes:

Historians debate whether the redeployment of [nuclear weapons-capable] B-29s to England successfully deterred the Soviets. But few ask how Stalin could have initiated the crisis in the first place. When he ordered access to Berlin cut off, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. (the Soviet Union would not explode its first nuclear weapons for another year). Cutting off access to Berlin carried with it a significant risk of war. Where two large armed groups confront each other in a narrow space, there is always the possibility of accidental escalation. Or escalation could have been intentional. One of the options considered by Washington during the crisis was sending an armored column to force its way up the autobahn to Berlin. Given the risk of provoking a nuclear war and the U.S. nuclear monopoly, why wasn’t Stalin deterred from initiating the blockade? If the risk of nuclear war deters, why did Stalin start a crisis that could have led to the use of nuclear weapons against his country?

In other words, politics often proceed independently of considerations of the threat of a nuclear attacks. Meanwhile, far from lending clarity to international relations, nuclear deterrence just creates another obstacle and adds another layer of complexity to world peace.

Will the Next Pope Embrace Liberation Theology?

Cross-posted from the Dissent Magazine blog Arguing the World.

Will the next pope embrace liberation theology? The conventional answer would be: fat chance. However, without going too far out on a limb, one could also answer in the affirmative. In their own ways, both responses will likely be correct.

The chances that a true radical will be selected as Pope are next to nil. That’s because none are in the running. Technically, any baptized male Catholic can be elected to the post. But, in practice, the pope is selected from the church’s cardinals under the age of eighty. At this point, all the eligible cardinals were appointed to their positions either by Pope Benedict XVI or by Pope John Paul II. Both men vigilantly stacked the deck with cardinals whose views range, in the words of one religion professor, from conservative to ultraconservative.

Liberal theologian Hans Küng gives a harsh assessment of Benedict’s selection of Vatican personnel. “Under the German pope, a small, primarily Italian clique of yes-men, people with no sympathy for the calls to reform, were allowed to come into power,” Küng stated. “They are partly responsible for the stagnation that stifles every attempt at modernization of the church system.”

The most brilliant suggestion I’ve seen for a candidate who would decisively break with established traditions (and who would need to come from outside the current pool of cardinals) was penned by E.J. Dionne of the Washington Post. In a recent column entitled, “The best choice for pope? A nun,” Dionne argued that “An all-male hierarchy adopted policies to cover up the [sex abuse scandal plaguing the church] and seemed far too inclined to put protecting the church’s image ahead of protecting children.” He added, “Throughout history, it’s not uncommon for women to be brought in to put right what men have put wrong.”

Since that’s not going to happen, we can at least hope for a church leader who recognizes and validates the critical social justice work carried out largely by nuns, rather than spending his time reprimanding women religious.

One of the candidates considered to be among the frontrunners in the papal conclave would appear, at first look, to fit that bill: Cardinal Peter Turkson of Ghana. Not only would Turkson, as an African, break the European stranglehold on the papacy, he would come to the office straight from serving as president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. In this capacity, Turkson oversaw the release of a 2011 document that gave a fairly stinging critique of the international financial system. It blasted speculative trading, reiterated previous church warnings against “idolatry of the market,” and argued, “No one can in conscience accept the development of some countries to the detriment of others.” This is what has led some commentators to suggest that liberation theology may make a comeback if Turkson becomes pope.

But as Naunihal Singh explains at the New Yorker, Turkson has a strong conservative side. He is notably homophobic, even by church standards, having defended anti-gay legislation in Africa and having linked the Catholic Church’s pedophilia scandals to cultures that are permissive of homosexuality (rather than to an internal institutional culture that prizes secrecy, hierarchy, and obedience). Turkson also caused a scandal last year by showing a fear-mongering and discredited anti-Muslim video to a meeting of church officials. The British Independent has dubbed the cardinal “Conservatism’s Cape crusader.”

While they may seem incongruous, Turkson’s seeming contradictions speak to a wider point: in order to understand the Vatican’s response to liberation theology, one must appreciate how individuals such as Turkson can be considered conservatives within the church and nevertheless produce statements strongly critical of neoliberal capitalism.

It is widely noted that, before he became Pope Benedict XVI, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger headed the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, formerly known as the office of the Inquisition. There he earned the nickname “God’s Rottweiler,” leading the effort to silence creative and non-conformist voices within Catholicism. During Ratzinger’s tenure as doctrinal enforcer, the church is said to have officially rejected liberation theology.

But this is only true in part. The Vatican did object to liberation theologians’ use of Marxist sociological analysis, and it rejected their challenges to the centralized authority of Rome. Yet, at the same time, it affirmed many of the central doctrines of liberation theology, especially those relating to poverty, inequality, and economic justice. Most notably, the “preferential option for the poor,” the once-radical idea that God takes sides and identifies with the oppressed and impoverished, has been mainstreamed as Catholic theological doctrine.

To this extent, if not necessarily in the overall orientation of his ministry, the next pope is almost certain to carry forward the liberationist tradition.

Under each of the last two popes, the church has released statements about the global economy that take cues from liberation theology’s teachings. John Paul II condemned “the resurgence of a certain capitalist neoliberalism which subordinates the human person to blind market forces.” And it is worth remembering that Pope Benedict gave Gustavo Gutiérrez, one of the founders and leading lights of liberation theology, a place of honor at anAsh Wednesday mass in 2007. Religion & Politics editor Tiffany Stanley notes that Ratzinger’s current replacement as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, German Archbishop Gerhard Müller, “is said to be sympathetic to liberation theology and even co-authored a book with Gutiérrez.”

Likewise, it’s fascinating to read the reflections of prominent Brazilian liberationist Leonardo Boff, who was famously silenced for a year in 1985 and who ultimately left the priesthood in 1992. Boff is critical of Benedict. But he was also on friendly terms with Ratzinger, and he cites occasions upon which the former cardinal referred favorably to his books.

As for the upcoming conclave, probably the best candidate one can hope for from the perspective of liberation theology is another Brazilian, Cardinal Cláudio Hummes, the former archbishop of São Paulo. Hummes has shifted towards the center in recent decades and, like Turkson, has taken some controversial and reactionary stances (in his case, opposing the use of condoms to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in Brazil). That said, he has significant progressive bona fides.

Preaching in working-class areas in and around São Paulo in the 1970s, Hummes supported Worker’s Party dissidents organizing against the country’s military junta. As Anna Flora Anderson of the Dominican School of Theology in São Paulo explained to the BBC in 2005: “The military would quickly shut down any union meeting. So one of the great things Claudio did was to open up the smaller churches [to activists]—so the unions could meet without interference.”

Hummes is a personal friend of former Brazilian president and Worker’s Party leader Lula da Silva. He has defended the land occupations of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra. And he has long been regarded as an ally of the grassroots “base communities” that put liberation theology into practice throughout Brazil. As the Washington Post reports, on his first day on the job as archbishop of São Paulo, in 1998, Hummes “attacked the spread of global capitalism, saying the privatization of state companies and the lowering of tariffs had contributed to the ‘misery and poverty affecting millions around the world.’”

Much more than the many yes-men in the conclave, Hummes would open the door for the revival of social justice ministry in the Catholic Church. Unfortunately, you should only put your money on the Brazilian to become the next pope if you like betting on long shots. As of this writing, the odd-makers have him at 50-1.

Mark Engler is a senior analyst with Foreign Policy In Focus and author of How to Rule the World: The Coming Battle Over the Global Economy (Nation Books, 2008). He can be reached via the website Democracy Uprising. You can follow Mark at his Facebook page.

Nuclear Weapons Have Outlived Their Usefulness — if They Ever Had Any

Five Myths About Nuclear WeaponsLong awaited by many of us in the arms control and disarmament communities, historian Ward Wilson’s book, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons, was published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt in January. It doesn’t fail to deliver. What at first seems like a short book soon becomes a distillate of years of the author’s thinking, to which the expansive footnotes and lengthy bibliography also attest.

Wilson is a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. For years unaffiliated, though, with either academy or a foundation, his writing style can be characterized as plain speaking and congenial, accessible to the general public as well as policymakers, strategists, and historians.

Sixty-eight years after the Trinity test, the first detonation of a nuclear weapon, arms control moves in fits and starts and total disarmament is considered unrealistic — unattainable to its advocates, inadvisable to most. Meanwhile, those members of the public who aren’t too frightened by existential issues or too distracted to face them view global warming as more urgent than nuclear weapons. Others operate under the illusion that the end of the Cold War has diminished the nuclear threat to the point where we can live with it.

Besides, the primal logic of deterrence — discouraging an attack by your ability to respond — makes perfect sense to many. But, nuclear weapons may not lend themselves to deterrence as well as conventional thinking holds. In fact, the idea that “nuclear deterrence works in a crisis” is one of Wilson’s myths — as is even the proposition that they keep us safe.

Actually, deterrence is the second pillar of faith in nuclear weapons. The first was erected when their detonation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II supposedly forced Japan to surrender. It’s also the first myth that Wilson attempts to debunk: “Nuclear weapons shock and awe opponents.” For one cannot stand without the other. As he wrote in a 2008 article (The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence) for Nonproliferation Review that helped put him on the map as a nuclear-weapons historian: “The collapse of the Hiroshima case undermines one of the cornerstones of nuclear deterrence theory.”

Turns out, as Wilson writes in Five Myths, “Japan’s leaders consistently displayed a lack of interest in the [conventional] bombing that was wrecking their cities.” To them, it was the Russian invasion of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island upon which the war hinged. With Russia also planning to invade Hokkaido, the northern-most of Japan’s islands, Japan realized it could not fight a war against both Russia and the United States-led Western powers. Wilson then turns the question around.

Proponents of nuclear weapons who claim that Japan was forced to surrender because of the bombing of Hiroshima face a difficult question: Why would Japan’s leaders have been motivated to act by an event that was not strategically decisive?

The main piece of evidence that Wilson uses to build his case against the efficacy of nuclear weapons is the Cuban missile crisis, about which you’ve no doubt already seen much revisionist history in commemoration of its fiftieth anniversary last year. Wilson, though, instead of concentrating on why our nukes didn’t deter Russia, focuses on why Russia’s nuclear threat didn’t deter President John Kennedy from blockading Cuba and demanding that nuclear missiles be removed from Cuba. “So why did,” Wilson asks, “nuclear deterrence fail? And why did Kennedy take steps that seem to meet [a] definition of reckless lunacy?” (Author’s emphasis.)

In still more picturesque language, he rephrases the question directly.

In the most dangerous nuclear crisis the world has ever known, one leader saw the nuclear deterrence stop sign, saw the horrifying image of nuclear war painted on it, and gunned through the intersection anyway.

In other words, fear of Russia’s nuclear weapons didn’t keep President Kennedy from putting the pedal to the metal. Wilson again:

One way that proponents of nuclear weapons explain Kennedy’s willingness to risk nuclear war is by arguing that U.S. nuclear superiority made the risk of nuclear war negligible.…But most of the senior participants and Kennedy himself said, either directly or indirectly, that nuclear superiority had had little to do with decisions made during the crisis.…by the late 1950s both sides had the ability to inflict significant damage in the event of a war, even after absorbing a nuclear strike.

Another approach that helped lend Wilson credibility early in his career was to forbear attacking nuclear weapons from the point of view of morality and, instead, hold them accountable on the basis of their actual usefulness as weapons.

The problem with nuclear weapons is that there is no way to concretely verify the claims that are made about their importance. There is really only one data point — Hiroshima — determining their cash basis. The danger is that we have overinflated their value by misinterpreting that one event.

Confident that he’d win, it’s as if Wilson agreed to cede the home-court advantage to the arrayed forces of national defense: “Body count aside, will nuclear weapons win wars?” (My words, not his.) More to the point, will bombing cities, known as area bombing in World War II, prove decisive in winning wars? Wilson writes:

People often talk about nuclear weapons’ ability to create destruction as if it were an accepted fact that destruction and military effectiveness are the same thing. But.…destruction does not win wars.

Among the instances he cites besides Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the siege of Stalingrad during which the Wehrmacht destroyed the city with bombing and artillery. Soviet soldiers clung to the ruins and eventually outlasted the German assault. Wilson concludes:

Destroying cities and killing civilians is large beside the point in terms of military strategy.

Each of the five myths transitions to the next. Wilson pulls this off exceptional gracefulness when, at the end of Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons, he addresses the subject of the nuclear genie — the idea that nuclear know-how and technology can’t be un-developed, as it were, and stuffed back into the bottle. Connecting the circle, he writes that obsolescence will obtain when it’s shown that nuclear weapons are no longer viewed as useful in winning wars.

Reconciling Displaced Libyans and Their Neighbors

While this month marked the second anniversary since the start of Libya’s uprising, the country is still struggling with the ramifications of its upheaval and the difficulties of reconciliation following its violent conflict. Thousands of Libyans remain internally displaced by ethnic tensions unleashed by the revolution.

The city of Tawergha is perhaps the most poignant example of the exile many Libyans have experienced: it is now a veritable “ghost town,” its residents forced to take refuge elsewhere following the catastrophic battles between loyalist and rebel forces that occurred in the area. Tawergha’s estimated 30,000 to 40,000 displaced residents continue to be prevented from returning to their homes due to safety concerns. The few who have tried to return have supposedly been stopped by Misratan brigades who “threatened to kill them and burn the remains of their houses,” according to the Libya Herald.

Tawergha lies along the road between the central coastal city of Sirte—Muammar Gaddafi’s last stronghold and the city where he was both born and killed—and the northwestern city of Misrata, a rebel stronghold that rose up in rebellion in February 2011. As a result of its proximity, Tawergha was occupied by Gaddafi’s forces and used as a base for loyalist military operations against the neighboring Misrata.

Tension between the two cities remains high, as residents of both Tawergha and Misrata have experienced the fallout from the violent clashes between loyalist and rebel forces. Misratans accuse Tawerghans of siding with Gaddafi, participating in his military operations against Misrata, and committing war crimes such as rape and looting. There is also a racial element to this tension, since Tawerghans typically have noticeably darker skin, and many of Gaddafi’s forces were comprised of African mercenaries as well as Libyans.

The reprisal for Tawerghans was swift after Gaddafi’s fall, with Misratan forces launching a series of attacks on the city that Amnesty International characterized as ethnic cleansing. The town’s infrastructure is considerably damaged—even uninhabitable—as a result of the rebel capture of the town in August 2011, which precipitated widespread fires, gunfights, and NATO airstrikes. Tawergha was later looted and pillaged by anti-Gaddafi forces, and the green sign to the city has been vandalized with “Misrata” graffiti.

Libya’s Deputy Prime Minister Awad Barasi has recently announced plans to address these internally displaced citizens, meeting with ministers to discuss solutions to the problem. Without state support, there is little chance that reconciliation or lasting peace can be achieved between these displaced groups and their neighbors.

Leslie Garvey is an intern at Foreign Policy in Focus.

Bulgaria: The Next Generation

Bulgaria’s younger generation carries the past more lightly.

Cross-posted from JohnFeffer.com. John is currently traveling in Eastern Europe and observing its transformations since 1989.

 Nevena Milosheva-Krushe

Nevena Milosheva-Krushe

My current project focuses on re-interviewing the people I talked to in East-Central Europe in 1990. But if I restricted my interviews to this group of people, I’d get a rather skewed picture of the region today. After all, I’d miss out on an entire generation of people that was too young to participate in the changes or was born afterwards.

To ensure that I have a more balanced picture, I thought it would be interesting to interview the children of the original interviewees. Nevena Milosheva-Krushe, the daughter of Mariana Milosheva-Krushe, is the first of these interviews.

Like many people of her generation, Nevena has no direct experience of the communist era. She was only two years old in 1989. She remembers the stories that her elders told her. But 1989 is as far away in time for her as the 1960s were for my generation (it took me a long time, for instance, to realize that Woodstock was something other than a character in the Peanuts comic strip).

Nevena works in one of the multinational companies with an office in Sofia. She is rather optimistic by temperament, a trait she shares with her activist mother but which is sometimes a sentiment in short supply in Bulgaria. And because of her contact with other ethnic groups and her own time spent abroad, she highly values multiculturalism.

“Since I was little, I had contacts with different groups through my mother,” she told me. “And then in the university we had people from different ethnic groups and also different countries, mostly from the Balkans. And in Amsterdam, we had people from very different places. I really don’t like generalizations that all people from this group are such and such. I experienced the same thing in Amsterdam: ‘You’re a Bulgarian and this means that you are not hard-working and so on.’”

It is perhaps this awareness of the outer world – and how the outer world perceives Bulgaria – that distinguishes the younger generation from those who lived during the communist period. From an early age the post-communist generation has travelled outside of Bulgaria and/or has had access to all sorts of global media. They carry the past more lightly and are often bemused by the intense arguments that still rage over what took place before they were born.

Of course, young people in Bulgaria are all over the map, literally as well as ideologically. There are young neo-fascists and young farmers and young populists and young drug addicts and young rock musicians and many many young people who are living outside of Bulgaria. Many of these young people share little in common except for the generation gap that separates them from their dinosaur parents. But that gap doesn’t seem very large in the case of Nevena and her mother.

The Interview

When did you first realize that you were living in a country that was completely different before you were born?

There were many things that were different compared to other countries. For instance, I remember the stories of when we had only one kind of chocolate or standing on line for bread. One of my first memories, when I was younger than 8 years old, is my grandmother telling me about the fall of the Berlin Wall. When I was 8, I traveled for the first time abroad and the difference was huge. We went to Switzerland.

Ah, well the difference between Switzerland and most countries is huge! Your mom said that you got a business degree. Where did you get that?

In Amsterdam. It was my master’s degree. My bachelor’s was at the American University in Bulgaria.

How was that experience at the American University?

Very interesting. Our educational system is much worse than the Western European and American education. But I wanted to be in Bulgaria, so that was my choice.

Were all the classes in English?


Was your English pretty good when you graduated high school?

I studied some subjects in English in high school. But I needed to study quite a lot more: to learn business terms and so on.

You were interested in business early on in life?

No, actually, I wanted to study politics. I started with politics at the university. But then I wanted to stay in Bulgaria and honestly I didn’t feel like going into politics in Bulgaria. I took a business course and it was very interesting. But I also studied journalism as a second degree.

You said you wanted to stay in Bulgaria. Why?

Because I am more optimistic than most people. Many things have improved a lot here, even though people are quite negative about everything around here most of the time. Many things continue to improve regardless of what specific party is ruling.

A lot of your classmates didn’t stay in Bulgaria. Did you have arguments trying to persuade them to stay or did they try to persuade you to go?

Yes, we had arguments. But to be honest, then I went to Amsterdam for a year for my masters. What was most different there was that it was more organized. It can be quite tempting to stay somewhere else. But again, I have my family and friends here.

You weren’t tempted to stay in Amsterdam?

A little bit. But finding a regular-level job there was much more difficult than finding one here.

It was easy to find a job here when you got back from Amsterdam?

Yes. I got a job at a company called Shevana. We deal with service departments for employees traveling around the world.

What are your responsibilities?

I’m in marketing and sales. We do different campaigns, communicating with different kinds of customers.

Customers just in Bulgaria?


That’s why you have to speak English.


You’ve seen Amsterdam. You’ve studied business. How would you evaluate the business climate here in Bulgaria? Is the workplace here basically the international standard? Or are there some things that are really frustrating?

I think it’s getting better and better. Many international companies have offices here by now. Most of the bigger ones and some smaller ones. Of course we’re a good destination. The salaries can be lower but at the same time the work standard is good. In Amsterdam, the salaries would be quite higher.

Can you give an example of something that was frustrating that is no longer frustrating?

At the beginning many companies were not paying maximum health benefits. For the past five years, this has been much better.

You said at one point that you decided not to do politics. Do you think the political situation has improved?

I think there’s some improvement. For example, it might sound strange, but now we have a subway line. Of course we also have more traffic. On social issues, I think it’s getting a bit better. There’s more tolerance of differences than some years ago. Of course, there’s still some problems, many problems, but I think it’s improving a bit. More foreigners are visiting the country than before.

In your free time you mentioned that you do volunteer work?

I haven’t had a lot of time for it, but I’ve helped my mother on some of her projects. But I’d like to help children, orphans, in my free time.

She mentioned that your friends and colleagues are also interested in volunteering.

For example, I have one friend working in a bank for seven years who also feels like doing something in his free time, because business gets a little tiring. You need to not just sell products but help people, without any salary. Most people are not doing a lot. But there is a desire to do more. But then we also have to stay at work quite late.

Have you gotten involved in any of the big environmental actions?

I’ve heard about them. But I’m more interested in topics connected to children or discrimination. I have a friend who works for this type of organization. I’m thinking of helping her.

On the issue of tolerance, you’ve said that the situation on the street is a little better and there are more visiting foreigners. But there’s also the anti-Roma sentiment. How do you explain these two things?

In other countries also, there’s been these tendencies after the collapse of the communist regimes: prejudice but also some improvement in tolerance. Before, we had the same Ataka type of thing, but it was not public. These people had the same views.

They just didn’t open their mouths in public?

Yes. And they didn’t have such a political party.

How much contact did you have with other Bulgarians of different ethnicities when you were at school or growing up?

Since I was little, I had contacts with different groups through my mother. And then in the university we had people from different ethnic groups and also different countries, mostly from the Balkans. And in Amsterdam, we had people from very different places. I really don’t like generalizations that all people from this group are such and such. I experienced the same thing in Amsterdam: “You’re a Bulgarian and this means that you are not hard-working and so on.”

In the business community here, is it mostly ethnic Bulgarians?

Mostly. But there are different people. The companies are international and for them it’s only important whether you do your job.

On the Roma issue, I’ve talked with people about three different policy directions: good jobs, good education, and political power. Which do you think is most important?

Education. But at the same time, in order to to start with education and get to political power we need to be more tolerant. In schools, for instance. Most Bulgarians are not very nice to other ethnicities.

Can you give some examples?

I remember in my first to fourth grade school, we had two Roma kids and they were mostly not treated in a nice fashion. That was not okay with me. We should start by understanding each other’s cultures.

Was there any Roma information in your textbooks or your classes when you were growing up?


Ethnic Turkish culture?

Only from the history textbooks about when we were enslaved by the Ottomans. But that was a long time ago. We should now just look at people as people.

What about at the American University? Were there classes about Roma or ethnic Turkish culture?

Nothing specific.

In the United States, the civil rights movement went hand in hand with a change in textbooks. It’s hard to have a change in people’s attitudes without that change in education. You were lucky to have your mother.

You’re right about education. We need to learn more about their culture. That would help people understand each other better. We can start with that.

You were more pessimistic about the future than you were in your assessment of the past.

Yes, but my view of the future was more optimistic than most people’s.

Yes, but why didn’t you say 8 about the future?

I think we are going to develop further but at a slower pace than other countries.

What do you think about the overall economy in Bulgaria? A lot of people tell me that they go abroad or don’t come back because of the lack of jobs. Is that something you hear among your friends?

Very often. But actually, I think things are getting a bit better than before. It’s as hard as in other countries. Before you go and live somewhere for a year, you can’t know what it’s like. Many people think that Western Europe is great, all well organized and arranged. But you’re still a foreigner over there. And it’s as hard to find a job as here. The salaries are low here. But our living standard is lower too. The minimum wage is quite low. And the pensions are really a big problem. I don’t think any grandparents can live by themselves without anyone helping them. That’s a problem.

When you hear the word NGO, what do you think?

People who help society but not related to profit.

So you have a positive association. I’ve heard that people here have negative associations with NGOs.

Yes. They feel like NGOs are not doing enough. But I think it’s because they are doing things for the long term. You have to be patient for the change they’re working for to come. Of course, I communicate with business people. They are thinking in terms of short-term profit. So, that’s a different mindset.

What do you think will happen in the next Bulgarian elections in the fall? Let’s say there are two scenarios: the one you want to happen and the one you don’t want to happen.

All the times that I could vote, I wasn’t voting for a scenario I wanted to happen but for the least-worst scenario.

Because your scenario wasn’t available.

Yes. I don’t think there’s any party that’s perfect, that I want to vote for now and forever. But of course, everyone has pitfalls. And everyone is trying to do something. Even the current government.

When you say that they’re trying to do something, did you have anything in mind? Other than the new subway.

The financial situation is not so bad in the context of the global economic situation. It could be quite worse.

Why haven’t young people come together to form a political party?

I think there’s quite a lot of fear. And people are not that active in civil society, including young people. They are trying some stuff like, as you said, on the forest issue. But still we need more activity. People focus on their job, their business, and that’s it.

What do you think of when you think of Europe?

The continent.

Does the continent include Bulgaria?

Yes, the whole continent includes Bulgaria. The EU also includes us. But we’re a new member, so there are certain restrictions.

Do you think the overall experience of joining the EU is a good one


Any negative aspects?

I don’t think so. We are a very small country, and we need to somehow to join the others. Of course the situation of the EU right now is not the best. We don’t have the Euro, and for the first time it’s a good thing that we are a little backward.

Yes, hooray for the leva!

Yes, exactly.

Do you see yourself living in Bulgaria for the rest of your life? When you talk to your friends, what do they think in terms of the future?

More people are staying here and wishing to stay here. Maybe five years ago, I knew many more people who wanted to leave. And now, many people want to stay.

When you look back to 1989, when you were two years old, and all that has changed or not changed, how would you evaluate that on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being least satisfied and 10 most satisfied?


Same scale, same period of time: your own personal life?


When you look into the next couple years, what do you expect for Bulgaria, on a scale of one to 10, with one being more pessimistic and 10 being most optimistic?


Sofia, October 2, 2012

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